Naturalness

Dorr, Cian; Hawthorne, John

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0001

Cited by 131 publications

(62 citation statements)

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“…Earman 1986: 88 andLoewer 2007: 320). Much recent discussion of the BSA has focused on how the 2 Some amendments of free combination are necessary to deal with fundamental quantitative properties or (vectorial) magnitudes (see Dorr and Hawthorne 2013, Hall 2012, Hawthorne 2006, and Weatherson 2015. Free recombination enables a reductive account of modality (see Lewis 1986b;cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

Making best systems best for us

Jaag

Loew

2018

Synthese

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Abstract:Humean reductionism about laws of nature appears to leave a central aspect of scientific practice unmotivated: If the world's fundamental structure is exhausted by the actual distribution of non-modal properties and the laws of nature are merely efficient summaries of this distribution, then why does science posit laws that cover a wide range of non-actual circumstances? In this paper, we develop a new version of the Humean best systems account of laws based on the idea that laws need to organize information in a way that maximizes their cognitive usefulness for creature like us. We argue that this account motivates scientific practice because the laws' applicability to non-actual circumstances falls right out of their cognitive usefulness.

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confidence: 99%

Making best systems best for us

Jaag

Loew

2018

Synthese

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“…For example, as well as being the properties that make for similarity, they are also supposed to be the properties relevant to causation (Armstrong, 1978b;Lewis, 1983, 347). But I am very sympathetic to the possibility that no one conception can play all the roles which sparse properties have been asked to (Schaffer, 2004;Dorr and Hawthorne, 2013). So in this paper, I focus exclusively on the role of sparse properties in explicating similarity.…”

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confidence: 99%

Two Conceptions of Similarity

Blumson

2017

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Abstract. There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.Keywords: similarity, resemblance, properties, distance, metric spaces. 1.There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first conception, the degree of similarity between particulars is a function of their number of (sparse) properties in common and not in common. This conception has its home in debates over the metaphysics of properties (see especially Armstrong, 1978b, 97-98, Oliver, 1996, 52 and Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2002, but is also found in the debate over the resemblance theory of pictorial representation (Blumson, 2014, 179-198).According to the second, the degree of dissimilarity between particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. This conception has its home in

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“…Imagine, for example, that the average American family has 1.5 children, and we define a unit for this quantity-call it avekid. There is nothing wrong with the definition of 'avekid'; it is perfectly determinate and we could use it without 30 See Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) for discussion. 31 Williams (2007).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For commentary, see Hawthorne (2007), Bays (2007) and Sider (2011: ch. 3). 32 Dorr and Hawthorne (2013). See also Schwartz (2014). any problem despite the fact that it is unnatural because children naturally come in single units.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the indeterminacy of the meter

Scharp

2017

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In the International System of Units (SI), 'meter' is defined in terms of seconds and the speed of light, and 'second' is defined in terms of properties of cesium 133 atoms. I show that one consequence of these definitions is that: if there is a minimal length (e.g., Planck length), then the chances that 'meter' is completely determinate are only 1 in 21,413,747. Moreover, we have good reason to believe that there is a minimal length. Thus, it is highly probable that 'meter' is indeterminate. If the meter is indeterminate, then any unit in the SI system that is defined in terms of the meter is indeterminate as well. This problem affects most of the familiar derived units in SI. As such, it is highly likely that indeterminacy pervades the SI system. The indeterminacy of the meter is compared and contrasted with emerging literature on indeterminacy in measurement locutions (as in Eran Tal's recent argument that measurement units are vague in certain ways). Moreover, the indeterminacy of the meter has ramifications for the metaphysics of measurement (e.g., problems for widespread assumptions about the nature of conventionality, as in Theodore Sider's Writing the Book of the World) and the semantics of measurement locutions (e.g., undermining the received view that measurement phrases are absolutely precise as in Christopher Kennedy's and Louise McNally's semantics for gradable adjectives). Finally, it is shown how to redefine 'meter' and 'second' to completely avoid the indeterminacy.

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Naturalness

Cited by 131 publications

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Making best systems best for us

Making best systems best for us

Two Conceptions of Similarity

On the indeterminacy of the meter

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