Naturalizing Goldman

Roth, Paul A.

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00859.x

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…As Miriam Solomon (1995, 207) quite properly notes with regard to Kitcher's pseudo-naturalism-a position she dubs "legend naturalism"-his "naturalism does no work-no data or theories from psychology or sociology shape the epistemic account-the naturalism is just window-dressing for a previously and independently developed account of scientific rationality." 8 Much the same is true, I have elsewhere argued, regarding Goldman (Roth 1999b).…”

Section: Why Naturalism Can Be Normativementioning

confidence: 77%

“…In light of this worry, this chapter addresses what for purposes of my account I take a viable philosophical naturalism to be and how that provides a cogent and unified perspective for the positions taken in this book. The structure of discussion that follows in this chapter will be to begin in part I by providing a general characterization of naturalism as I prefer to understand it (see also Roth 1999aRoth , 1999bRoth , 2006Roth , 2008a. This account, I acknowledge (and typically for Quinean accounts such as my own), confronts three interrelated criticisms.…”

Section: Methodological Naturalism and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation

Roth¹

2019

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in the ensuing pages, his work also has been determinative of my own thinking on this topic. As I told him, for many years I had taped to my computer screen a quote from him that also ultimately served as an epigraph for my paper "The Pasts": "We choose our past in the same way that we choose our future." What I often imagine myself to be doing is offering an account of why I take this to be correct by reformulating his insights as a conclusion of a type of philosophical argument.Regarding then Danto, Mink, and White, much of this book consists in efforts to knit together insights gleaned from each within an epistemological perspective forged by my readings of W. V. O. Quine and T. S. Kuhn. This allows me to answer questions regarding historical explanation debated since the nineteenth century (see Patton 2015; Dewulf 2017b).A key portion of this book originated from an invitation to develop my views by Mary Morgan and Norton Wise. I received helpful challenges and intellectual impetus as well from conversations with and questions by John Beatty and Ken Waters. As a consequence of their questions I briefly venture to discuss in chapter 4 narratives in science. However, it remained a primary goal for me to address how narrative explanation, and so histories as a form of empirical inquiry, relate to disciplines unproblematically taken to be sciences.At the very beginning of my efforts to weld some three decades of writings into a unified line of thought, Lisa Clark provided invaluable assistance, and to her I owe an immense debt. She diligently worked through a very rough early version of my manuscript with patience, intelligence, and insight. Without her editorial help and extensive suggestions, I doubt that I would have found the project doable. I can list names of only some of the many people whose feedback on one part or another of this project over the years has been of importance to me:

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Section: Why Naturalism Can Be Normativementioning

confidence: 77%

Section: Methodological Naturalism and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%