1995
DOI: 10.2307/2940786
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Naturalized Platonism Versus Platonized Naturalism

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Cited by 110 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…However, there are a variety of strategies that a descriptivist can employ to make their account of formal properties consistent with naturalism. See, for instance, Linsky and Zalta (1995) and Maddy (1990). distinctive feature of logical (as opposed to extra-logical) consequences, this means descriptivist accounts provide a superior explanation of intuitive difference between the logical and the extra-logical.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, there are a variety of strategies that a descriptivist can employ to make their account of formal properties consistent with naturalism. See, for instance, Linsky and Zalta (1995) and Maddy (1990). distinctive feature of logical (as opposed to extra-logical) consequences, this means descriptivist accounts provide a superior explanation of intuitive difference between the logical and the extra-logical.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Zalta and Linsky [1995] have defended a similar view: they claim that "there are as many abstract objects of a certain sort as there possibly could be." But their conception of abstract objects is rather unorthodox, and for this reason, their view is quite different, in several respects, from FBP.9 Moreover, they have not used FBP in the way that I have, arguing that platonists can solve the traditional problems with their view if and only if they endorse FBP.…”
Section: Anti-platonistic Realism (Physicalism and Psychologism)mentioning
confidence: 95%
“…This is what Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have explicitly suggested. Their aim is to provide for an appropriate characterization of the notion of mathematical object to be used as the basis for a platonist account of mathematics, where this is supposed to apply to actual mathematical theories as they are, rather than as they may be according to any suggested recasting of them in new terms (Linsky andZalta, 1995, 2006;Zalta, 1999Zalta, , 2000. According to Zalta, this characterization lays the ground for a neo-logicist programme, although of a substantially different form from the one Hale and Wright propose.…”
Section: Linsky Zalta and 'Object Theory': Mathematics And Logic (Ormentioning
confidence: 99%