Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

Hotte, Louis

doi:10.2139/ssrn.306259

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…We now generalize this to allow for the possibility that the state's decision not to govern creates an opportunity for entry by others interested in exploiting the vacated position. 37 It is possible to model most of the various governmental functions (policing, protecting, and penalizing) as functions potentially performed by users rather than the state, but it is problematic to do so (Acheson 2003;Hotte 2001Hotte , 2005. 38 In regard to property rights, these core functions are indicated by the fact that property owners are usually allowed to monitor boundaries and to identify interlopers to police, but not given the These are core functions which the state should not devolve, as the transferability of such functions signals the opening of a very broad and wide-ranging contest regarding state powers.…”

Section: Problems Resulting From Problems Of Governance: Corruption mentioning

confidence: 99%

Re-telling the Tale of the Commons: A Tale of Rent Seeking, Corruption, Stockpiling and (Even) Tragedy

Swanson

2007

IRERE

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The tale of the tragedy of the commons is re-told as a problem of vertical governance rather than a problem of horizontal contracting. States make the fundamental determination concerning the amount of management conferred upon resources within their territories, and the groups using these resources are substantially constrained by this prior determination. In particular, it is demonstrated that it is unlikely that institutions might arise endogenously at the user level, when the state has abrogated its responsibility to generate them at the sovereign level. States make the decision to pursue something other than first-best management because institutions require investment and as such must compete against other such investments within the economy. This results in a distinct form of the tragedy of the commons, in which other agents attempt to enter and to exploit the vacated governance positions abrogated by the state, resulting in problems of corruption, waste, and worse.

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Section: Problems Resulting From Problems Of Governance: Corruption mentioning

confidence: 99%

Re-telling the Tale of the Commons: A Tale of Rent Seeking, Corruption, Stockpiling and (Even) Tragedy

Swanson

2007

IRERE

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“…This simplifying assumption departs from the recent literature that focuses on institutional failures, conflicts, and corruption (Barbier et al, 2005;Hotte, 2005;Amacher et al, 2008) to explain the link between deforestation and slow growth patterns.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Growth, deforestation and the efficiency of the REDD mechanism

Ollivier¹

2012

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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This paper assesses the long term impacts of an international transfer called the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) mechanism, which aims at preserving tropical forests of the recipient economy. This two-sector economy faces a dilemma between economic growth and deforestation. The rural sector can substitute reproducible capital for agricultural land whereas the manufacturing sector only requires capital. The model shows that the REDD mechanism has a non-monotonic effect on steady state welfares. For low transfer schemes, the agricultural output increases with the transfer even though less land is under cultivation. For high transfer schemes, the increase in the transfer may not offset the decrease in the agricultural output. The open-loop symmetric Nash equilibrium in a dynamic deforestation game predicts that redistributing the transfer among a finite number of producers is less efficient in reducing deforestation than in the social optimum.

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“…This increased enforcement effect may be a dominant factor during early stages of migration, but eventually the direct effect determines ex post migration risks (Hotte, 2005, also argues this in a different model). Due to lower costs, protection effort can be increased while keeping outlays at their previous level.…”

Section: Environment and Development Economics 287mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Hotte (2005) and Clarke et al (1993) examine agricultural land users' costly private enforcement effort such as building fences or obtaining formal title. Hotte (2005) and Clarke et al (1993) examine agricultural land users' costly private enforcement effort such as building fences or obtaining formal title.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deforestation and land use under insecure property rights

Amacher¹,

Koskela

Ollikainen

2009

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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We examine the implications of migration and insecure property rights to land use and deforestation in tropical frontier forests. Three forms of property rights risks are introduced to basic land-use forms. Illegal logging risk is associated with forest plantations, a land expropriation risk affects land in agriculture and plantation forestry, and illegal logging risks threaten native forest land. Public and private landowners can reduce these risks by employing costly enforcement effort. We show how that migration, expropriation, and illegal logging risks lead to deforestation by promoting agricultural expansion, and illegal logging. Higher public enforcement reduces illegal logging, but higher private enforcement may or may not reduce deforestation depending on migration pressures. Higher timber prices have an ambiguous effect on deforestation, but an increasing value of non-timber benefits decreases or leaves deforestation unchanged depending on the incentive structures of illegal loggers.

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Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

Abstract: This may explain the more frequent prevalence of free access in lessdeveloped countries. I show that higher resource prices will not lead to more free-access, but may lead to "value destruction".

Cited by 8 publications

References 28 publications

Re-telling the Tale of the Commons: A Tale of Rent Seeking, Corruption, Stockpiling and (Even) Tragedy

Re-telling the Tale of the Commons: A Tale of Rent Seeking, Corruption, Stockpiling and (Even) Tragedy

Growth, deforestation and the efficiency of the REDD mechanism

Deforestation and land use under insecure property rights

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