Natural Powers and Powerful Natures

Abstract

The justification of a wholly non-Humean conceptual scheme, based upon the idea of enduring individuals with powers, rests in part on the success of such a scheme in resolving the problems bequeathed to us by the Humean tradition and in part must be achieved by a careful construction of the metaphysics of the new scheme itself. By this we mean a thorough exposition of the meaning and interrelations of the concepts of the new scheme. It is to the latter task that we turn in this paper, being satisfied that the power of the scheme to give a rational account of science has been shown, and that its effectiveness in resolving the Humean problems and dilemmas has been amply demonstrated.

Methodological individualism as anti-reductionism

“…Before this, it is worth noting that the basic units represent “living parts,” so they represent active or driving forces. They thus introduce an “active” epistemological approach escaping forms of Humean metaphysics, where the causal relationships represent external relationships between discrete particulars, that is, where things have no inherent tendency to behave as they do, so that causal powers do not exist (Ellis, 2002; Harré and Madden, 1973; Jacobs, 2017; Mumford and Anjum, 2012; Mumford, 2009).…”

“… 6. This distinction is proposed by Phyllis McKay Illari and Jon Williamson (2011). Contemporary premises for active approaches notably take root in Harré (1970), Harré and Madden (1973) and Bhaskar (1975). On the notion of capacities, see Nancy Cartwright, (1983, 1989, 1999, 2007).…”

Generality and Necessity in Three Types of Theory About Human Communication, With Special Attention to Rules Theory

“…The second conceptualization of the laws perspective, natural necessity, views laws as descriptions of the effects of "powerful particulars" (Harre & Madden, 1973). In this view, entities exist which have powers to act in describable ways.…”

“…Natural necessity laws are limited to the domain in which a generative mechanism exerts its power, presuming that no two generative mechanisms with competing powers occupy the same domain. Further, the natural necessity position is caught in a conceptual regress involving the nature of the generative mechanism which has specified powers (Harre, 1973), making a specification of domain problematic.…”

What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world? Powerful structure

“…The constraint that Harré adopts for his Parmenidean individuals is that these fundamental entities are pure-power (Harré, 1970;Harré & Madden, 1975 individuals, which then constitute complex, manifest objects (Harré, 1970;Harré, 2001;Harré & Madden, 1975;Madden & Sachs, 1972 In referring to 'individuals', 'entities' and 'particles', I use the terms loosely, in line with my earlier objection to particle-hood. In the sense that fluctuations are of the field-the sole underlying entitythey are not distinct from it.…”