Natural Moralities

Abstract

To be called a relativist, especially a moral relativist, is to be condemned as someone who holds that “anything goes”. Frequently the term is part of a dichotomy: either accept relativism or accept universalism: the view that only one true morality exists. This book defends a new version of relativism that is both an alternative to, and fits between, universalism and relativism as usually defined. Pluralistic relativism does accord with one aspect of relativism as usually defined: there is no single true morality. Beyond that, it is argued that there can be a plurality of true moralities, moralities that exist across different traditions and cultures, all of which address facets of the same problem: how we are to live well together. A comparative and naturalistic approach is applied to the understanding of moralities, with discussion of a wide array of positions and texts within the Western canon as well as in Chinese philosophy, and drawing on not only philosophy, but also psychology, evolutionary theory, history, and literature in making a case for the importance of pluralism in moral life and in establishing the virtues of acceptance and accommodation. A central theme is that there is no single value or principle or ordering of values and principles that offers a uniquely true path for human living, but variations according to different contexts that carry within them a common core of human values. We should thus be modest about our own morality, learn from other approaches, and accommodate different practices in our pluralistic society.

Identifying Virtues and Values Through Obituary Data-Mining

“…Although cultural anthropology of the early 20 th century tended to support strong versions of relativism, cross-cultural psychological work by Schwartz [42] and philosophical interpretations of value-pluralism [43] suggest that there is at least as much variance in values within cultures as there is between them. This project thus illuminates both universal human values and the kinds of values-related variability that may differentiate communities.…”

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

“…As noted earlier, there is no intrinsic reason why moral beliefs must be grounded in objective facts rather than subjective preferences in order to carry moral weight in guiding our behavior (Wong, 2006). Nonetheless, lay theories of morality may attribute moral beliefs to facts about the external world, rather than to the collectively shared opinions of a society.…”

“…According to moral relativism, if we had different traditions and cultural histories we would have different moral beliefs, which would be no more "right" or "wrong" than those we now hold (Harman, 1975). In recent decades, philosophers and psychologists alike have adopted less absolutist positions on morality in light of evidence that people across cultures and time periods differ radically in their moral beliefs (Flanagan, Sarkissian, & Wong, 2008;Haidt, 2007;MacIntyre, 1984;Rai & Fiske, 2011;Wong, 2006). In the present paper we examine what effects, if any, exposure to these different moral perspectives may have on moral behavior and moral intentions.…”

“…In philosophy, meta-ethical relativism accepts that our moral beliefs are ultimately subjective, but does not hold the normative position that this subjectivity forces us to tolerate behaviors that we find morally disagreeable, nor that our own behavior should necessarily be impaired (Wong, 2006). And yet, is it possible that the folk conception of moral relativism carries less weight for laypeople than does moral absolutism, because the former is thought to imply that nothing is definitively right or wrong?…”

Triune Ethics Theory and Moral Personality

“…Th e three ethical motivations may confl ict: for example, a person may struggle against feeling threatened while trying to maintain a sense of compassion. Th e individual may feel a sense of "moral ambivalence" because of underlying "moral value pluralism" (Wong, 2006 ). For instance, as a person is victimized, does one stand by like everyone else in order to avoid looking foolish, or does one put selfconcern aside and operate from compassion and intervene?…”