Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and Epistemological Considerations

Abstract

Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible but one or the other approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper broadens the perspective by considering homologues as another example of natural kinds, comparing them with analogues as functionally defined kinds. Given that there are various types of natural kinds, I discuss the different theoretical purposes served by diverse kind concepts, suggesting that there is no clear-cut distinction between natural kinds and other kinds, such as functional kinds. Rather than attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of 'natural' kind, a more fruitful approach consists in the epistemological study of how different natural kind concepts are employed in scientific reasoning.

Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims

“…Scientific models are not all-purpose tools, but useful only for certain explanatory aims, and alternative models may be needed in an empirical domain. epistemological issues are equally important, in particular the philosophical study of which particular explanatory aims scientists pursue when using kinds in their theorizing, and whether and how a grouping of objects into a kind meets the given explanatory aim (Brigandt 2009(Brigandt , 2011b. 6 The philosophical importance of values in science has been particularly stressed by social studies of science and feminist philosophy of science (Douglas 2009;Kourany 2010).…”

Biological Taxonomy and Ontology Development: Scope and Limitations

“…This convention matches up well with human cognitive abilities and inference needs (Brigandt, 2009;Franz, 2009). For instance, it is not necessary for humans to examine specimens of every species of the scarab beetle superfamily Scarabaeoidea in order to reliably recognize them as such.…”

“…Smith et al, 2007;Dahdul et al, 2010;Mungall et al, 2010). In either case, researchers should for the most part refrain from resolving "deep questions" about the ontological nature of taxa because the answers will vary according to the preferred inferential context (Brigandt, 2009).…”

An Essentialistic View of the Species Problem

“…The popular belief that "classes cannot evolve" [5,59] is not pertinent to biological taxa, since they are classes of a special kind-they are the constituents of the hierarchically evolving organic world. Their intensions comprise an evolutionary sequence themselves and, simultaneously, direct the internal (extensional) evolution of taxa, defining their internal diversity.…”

“…They have tried to make a shift from 'organismal traits' to 'phylogenetic relationships' [11], but the wider character concept also was proposed long ago, and it even covers 'phylogenetic relationships' as a particular case. In a wider meaning, a character is an independent variable consisting of mutually exclusive character states [59,[70][71]. These states may be displayed simultaneously, as in Mendelian inheritance, or, being apomorphic and plesiomorphic [72], they may follow each other in time.…”