2017
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3087900
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Natural Disasters and Governmental Aid: Is There a Charity Hazard?

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
4
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
4

Relationship

3
1

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 46 publications
(29 reference statements)
0
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…This could be a problem for the accuracy of our flood variable if penetration was correlated to flood risk. However, household-level analyses of flood insurance coverage in Germany find no evidence of such a correlation (Andor et al 2017, Hudson et al 2017). This may be due to risk-based insurance pricing.…”
Section: Treatment Variable: Insured Flood Damagementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This could be a problem for the accuracy of our flood variable if penetration was correlated to flood risk. However, household-level analyses of flood insurance coverage in Germany find no evidence of such a correlation (Andor et al 2017, Hudson et al 2017). This may be due to risk-based insurance pricing.…”
Section: Treatment Variable: Insured Flood Damagementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As flood insurance is not mandatory but the risk of extreme weather events is increasing, the issue of low insurance penetration is becoming more pressing and politically relevant. In the aftermath of recent major flood events significant governmental aid was provided to noninsured households (Andor, Osberghaus, & Simora, 2020), which may have increased the perception that private precaution is not necessary. Moreover, many households consider themselves to be insured even though they are not (Osberghaus, 2015).…”
Section: Flood Risk Management and Awareness Campaigns In Germanymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, private actors may refrain from costly insurance because they expect financial relief payments from the government or charity organizations in case a disaster hits (which is referred to as "charity hazard", see Andor et al 2020, Raschky et al 2013, Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007. Indeed, this expectation is grounded on experience.…”
Section: Background and Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We base our analysis on the existing literature on (1) charity hazard in natural disaster insurance markets and (2) loss experience effects in insurance decisions. Regarding charity hazard, the disincentive to privately insure when expecting relief payments has been postulated theoretically (Buchanan 1975;Coate 1995) and tested empirically (e.g., Davlasheridze et al 2019;Kousky et al 2018; for a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, see Andor et al 2020). While the theoretical literature unanimously predicts a negative effect of compensation on insurance and other precautionary measures, the findings in the empirical literature are more ambiguous.…”
Section: Background and Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%