Nationalist Strategies and European Integration

Abstract

Contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism remains alive and well across an increasingly integrated Europe. While most nationalisms are not violent, the desire for greater national voice by both states and groups continues to exist in both the East and the West. As the European Union deepens and widens, states and groups are choosing among four nationalist strategies: traditional, substate, transsovereign, and protectionist. The interplay among these nationalisms is a core part of Europe's dynamic present and future.

Comparing and theorizing state–diaspora relations

“…Kalicki (2009, p. 177) concurs that, "despite some ethno-nationalist rhetoric" South Korea's debates about extra-territorial voting "have above all been grounded in contractual/civic considerations." Several important studies say similar things about Hungary's Status Laws which, though interpreted by neighboring nationalists as irredentist sabre-rattling, were more about integrating Hungary within a multicultural Europe where national territories are becoming less important (see Csergo & Goldgeier, 2004;Ieda, 2004;Waterbury, 2010a;Fowler, 2002, p. 230). Though some scholars link India's diaspora outreach to Hindu nationalism (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000;Rajagopal, 2000), others see it more as a quest for loyal corporate allies (Dickinson & Bailey, 2007;Varadarajan, 2010;Xavier, 2011).…”

Kosovo and the Framing of Non-Secessionist Self-Government Claims in Romania

“…Against this backdrop, the involvement of the Hungarian kin-state became increasingly divisive in multiple fields of political contestation. Two landmark events in this dynamic were, first, Hungary's adoption of the so-called Status Law in 2001, which established a framework for the Hungarian state to provide benefits to Hungarians living in neighbouring countries-fuelling divisions between Budapest and Bucharest, and deepening divisions in Hungary over the issue of the Hungarian state's responsibility for Hungarians abroad; and second, the 2004 failed referendum campaign to grant Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians abroad, which further deepened the political divide in Hungary and increased distrust among Hungarians on both sides of the border (Kovács 2005;Csergő & Goldgeier 2004, 2013Waterbury 2010). Since 2010, the Hungarian government under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has actively supported RMDSZ's more radical 'autonomist' challengers.…”

The state-to-nation balance and war

“…Such a variation might, for example, explain the more peaceful outcome in the case of the ethnic Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia in contrast to the intense violence among the ethno-national groups in the Yugoslav case in the 1990s (Brubaker 1998: 282-83;Csergo and Goldgeier 2004). The less credible the connection between past nationalist violence and present threats, the lower the likelihood of the eruption of violence and vice versa.…”