Nationalism in the Russian media: content analysis of newspaper coverage surrounding conflict in Stavropol, 24 May–7 June 2007

Abstract

This paper considers the role of Russian print media and government in forming and publicizing nationalist sentiment through a content analysis of newspaper coverage of ethnic conflict in Stavropol in 2007. It shows that though the government officially pursues an inclusive multicultural approach (which I call associative nationalism), newspapers owned by Kremlin-loyal business holdings printed quite nationalist and sensationalist versions of the events in question. I argue that this is a passive promotion of a dissociative type of nationalism on the part of the Kremlin, which works against its stated purposes of bringing together all those in the Russian territory into a united national identity.

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“…This allows the state to have a direct role in crafting narratives for the population. Schenk () noted that the Russian state has a history of heavy‐handed involvement in creating public messages through media outlets as part of Putin's “vertical of power” project. Most Russians use the television as their primary source of news and media broadcasts, in particular, have been guarded closely by the state (Schenk, ).…”

“…Schenk () noted that the Russian state has a history of heavy‐handed involvement in creating public messages through media outlets as part of Putin's “vertical of power” project. Most Russians use the television as their primary source of news and media broadcasts, in particular, have been guarded closely by the state (Schenk, ). The control of television broadcasts by the Russian state is used to form a single, controlled, information space for citizens (Simmons, ).…”

“…The control of television broadcasts by the Russian state is used to form a single, controlled, information space for citizens (Simmons, ). Since 2005, the Russian state has taken further measures to tighten control on media by strengthening media laws against messages deemed capable of causing social strife (CPJ, ) and consolidated virtually all print and broadcast outlets through government subsidies or ownership by regime loyalists (Schenk, ). As a result, according to Oates (2007), all national television channels are under the direct, or indirect, control of the state.…”

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