“…Although neo-Keynesian and protectionist approaches to crisismanagement followed, including renationalisation of financial institutions and industry, these were only temporary and directed towards salvaging the existing neoliberal model (Bruff 2014, pp. 120-1;Voszka 2018). To analytically distinguish between neoliberal and postneoliberalism, alternative economic strategies need to be legitimised by a long-term antiestablishment ideological-state formation and politicise the role of the state in terms of ownership, its allocative mechanisms and management of the economy.…”
Section: Differentiating Between Neoliberalism and Post-neoliberalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can be explained by faster and more extensive privatisation processes in Hungary in the early 1990s, whereas Poland followed only in the late 1990s as experimentation with national capitalism failed (Gowan 1995;Bohle and Greskovits 2012). By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary's scale of state ownership was smaller than the EU average or when compared to the new EU member states in CEE (Voszka 2018). Moreover, the direct control of the state over business enterprises has decreased significantly in Hungary between 1998 and 2013, whereas in Poland it has remained almost the same during that period (EC 2016, 17).…”
Section: The Factors Behind the Heterodox Turn And The Variation Betwmentioning
This paper analyses the economic dimension of populist governance in post-crisis Europe by exploring whether and in what ways populist economic policies diverge from neoliberal orthodoxy. Existing literature on contemporary populism in Central and Eastern Europe is ambivalent on this question and lacks systematic analyses of populist economic policies while in government. The comparative analysis of the Fidesz-led government in Hungary and the Law and Justice government in Poland is used to analyse the policy shifts in different domains. The main claim is that a combination of both domestic ideological change at the level of government and transnationally conditioned structural factors need to be considered to explain the shift towards and the variation in the pursuit of a 'heterodox' economic strategy under the two populist governments. The paper concludes by offering a reflection on why the analysed policy changes do not correspond with a more decisive shift towards an alternative trajectory of capitalist development in post-crisis Europe.
“…Although neo-Keynesian and protectionist approaches to crisismanagement followed, including renationalisation of financial institutions and industry, these were only temporary and directed towards salvaging the existing neoliberal model (Bruff 2014, pp. 120-1;Voszka 2018). To analytically distinguish between neoliberal and postneoliberalism, alternative economic strategies need to be legitimised by a long-term antiestablishment ideological-state formation and politicise the role of the state in terms of ownership, its allocative mechanisms and management of the economy.…”
Section: Differentiating Between Neoliberalism and Post-neoliberalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can be explained by faster and more extensive privatisation processes in Hungary in the early 1990s, whereas Poland followed only in the late 1990s as experimentation with national capitalism failed (Gowan 1995;Bohle and Greskovits 2012). By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary's scale of state ownership was smaller than the EU average or when compared to the new EU member states in CEE (Voszka 2018). Moreover, the direct control of the state over business enterprises has decreased significantly in Hungary between 1998 and 2013, whereas in Poland it has remained almost the same during that period (EC 2016, 17).…”
Section: The Factors Behind the Heterodox Turn And The Variation Betwmentioning
This paper analyses the economic dimension of populist governance in post-crisis Europe by exploring whether and in what ways populist economic policies diverge from neoliberal orthodoxy. Existing literature on contemporary populism in Central and Eastern Europe is ambivalent on this question and lacks systematic analyses of populist economic policies while in government. The comparative analysis of the Fidesz-led government in Hungary and the Law and Justice government in Poland is used to analyse the policy shifts in different domains. The main claim is that a combination of both domestic ideological change at the level of government and transnationally conditioned structural factors need to be considered to explain the shift towards and the variation in the pursuit of a 'heterodox' economic strategy under the two populist governments. The paper concludes by offering a reflection on why the analysed policy changes do not correspond with a more decisive shift towards an alternative trajectory of capitalist development in post-crisis Europe.
We analyse the legitimacy of public enterprises that perform economic activities by focusing on the citizens' subjective preferences, i.e. determining their political legitimacy. Using data from a representative survey conducted among 318 citizens of the German state of Rhineland-Palatine, we explore determinants for the support of either privatisation efforts or the instrumental thesis, a widespread principle in German-speaking countries, which considers public enterprises solely as instruments to fulfil economic policy objectives. Our results indicate that the respondents' perception of the efficiency of public enterprises as well as their personal economic situation are important factors for the support of privatisation. The influential factors for the use of public enterprises as policy instruments are political ideology, the perception of a higher security of supplying goods and services as well as opinions regarding corporate social responsibility. The subjective preferences of a (democratic) country's citizens are thus an important reason why the public sector should or should not play an active part in providing goods and services. This can play an important role when decision makers from the public sector are keen to take into account the citizens' approval or disapproval of privatisation measures.
“…7 In other words: it was systemic, rather than policy-induced. In so doing it has been markedly different from the West European trends, where it was a trend, and even more so from American solutions, when state involvement was temporary only (Voszka, 2018b).…”
Section: Institutionalised Improvisation Rather Than Institution-builmentioning
This paper offers a political economy perspective of Hungary under the Orbán regime (2010-18). What specific variety of capitalism emerged from the series of centralising measures pertaining to property, banking, fiscal management and the division among various policy fields? We provide a functional overview of the Hungarian model of the market applying the varieties of capitalism framework. How far did it all succeed? The two hypotheses to be tested are (a) that incremental change translated into a new quality in 2010-18; and (b) that it were the uniquely favourable external conditions rather than institutional and policy innovations that explain less than exceptional outcomes.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.