2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00511.x
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National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

Abstract: Journal articleIFPRI3; ISIMTIDP

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Cited by 31 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…The numerator is interpreted as the cost of meeting the standard σ. As in Gulati and Roy (2008), this function is increasing and strictly convex (φ σ > 0, φ σσ > 0), with φ(0) = 0. 8 The denominator, ψ(σ), captures the benefit accruing to the producer that meets a standard σ.…”
Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The numerator is interpreted as the cost of meeting the standard σ. As in Gulati and Roy (2008), this function is increasing and strictly convex (φ σ > 0, φ σσ > 0), with φ(0) = 0. 8 The denominator, ψ(σ), captures the benefit accruing to the producer that meets a standard σ.…”
Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A standard might correct for a market failure, it might be imposed as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, it might respond to equity concerns or it might address political economy considerations. While the Gulati and Roy (2008) model explicitely models the standard as a policy to correct for a market failure (namely, a pollution externality generated by the consumption of good 1), we do not need to specify the rationale for the standard in this context.…”
Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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