National past and populism: the re-elaboration of fascism and its impact on right-wing populism in Western Europe

Abstract

Berger (2010) 123 Historical aberration. Gildea (2002) 60−68 Responsibility of foreign occupation, Nazi tyranny. Gildea (2002) 75 French and Germans as victims of Nazi rule. Jackson (2014) 141 Collaboration as occupation parenthesis. Judt (1992) 96 Aberration, interlude, activity of minority. Michel (2011) 182 Block out responsibility. Rousso (1990) 41 Myth of "liberation" from occupation. Secondary narrative: heroization/cancellation Art (2011) 372 Exculpatory, myth of resistance against occupation. Art (2011) 376 Contrition after affirmation of Front National. Bell (2013) 156 Forgetfulness. Berger (2010) 123 Communist and Gaullist resistance. Berger (2010) 131 Positively accentuated national history. Gildea (2002) 75 Cancellation of Algerian war. Golsan (2006) 78−79 Gaullist myth of resistance. Jackson (2014) 141 Gaullist and communist myth of fight against traitors. Michel (2011) 170 Myth of Vichy regime's isolation, everyone was resisting. Rousso (1990) 101 Resistance mythology against occupation.

Why Is the AfD so Successful in Eastern Germany? An Analysis of the Ideational Foundations of the AfD Vote in the 2017 Federal Election

“…We keep the model as simple as possible. At the core of most theories of vote choice is the idea that citizens will choose the party that they feel best represents their values, general attitudes, and specific views on issues they care about (Campbell 1980(Campbell [1960; Downs 1957;Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Applied to nativism and populism, this means that citizens may compare their own attitudes regarding these idea elements with the corresponding stances of the political parties and then develop a preference for the party that fits best with their own attitudes.…”

“…Even if the levels of these ideational features are the same in both parts of the country, larger effects in the east-a greater relevance of these features when citizens decide how to vote-might also lead to more AfD support. It is a well-established insight of electoral research that the relevance of individual-level features is in large part a function of the communicative context in which individuals think and act (e.g., Campbell 1980Campbell [1960). Accordingly, differences in the relevance of populism and nativism for vote choice are a function of different communicative contexts in eastern and western Germany.…”

Where is the middle? Considering the socio-political centre in Germany

“…'Collective memory' narrows the opportunity structure for far-right parties in Germany, though not elsewhere. Europe's 'dramatic populist wave' and a 'loosening of taboos' stimulated a caveat that 'collective memories are not fixed' (Caramani & Manucci, 2019, p. 1177. Explorations of the linkage between populism and 'sovereignism' (Basile & Mazzoleni, 2020;Verzichelli, 2020) imply high nationalist potential without addressing the middle.…”

Those were the days: welfare nostalgia and the populist radical right in the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden

“…Radical-right populism and (welfare) nostalgia: existing approaches In the debate on radical-right populism, it has almost become a truism to remark that PRR politicians are adept at deploying collective memory to cultivate a romantic image of the national past and mobilise their electorate (Akkerman et al, 2016;Caramani & Manucci, 2019;Inglehart & Norris, 2016;Wodak & Forchtner, 2014). Despite this recognition, most authors in the field only mention nostalgia sporadically and rarely use it as an analytical lens.…”