National parliaments and the new contentiousness of trade

Abstract

Rather than becoming obsolete, national parliaments have come back obstinately in the politics of trade. This article develops this proposition and explores its contribution to the idea of 21 st-century trade as contentious market regulation. Contra the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments' assertion entrenches the role of domestic actors in the EU trade liberalization policy, and fleshes out its multi-level parliamentary bases. We discuss the role, drivers, and patterns of parliamentary assertion and explore parliamentary assertion using preliminary survey and case study material. We find that the TTIP negotiations represented the tippingpoint of parliamentary assertion. Through interpretation and political engagement, national parliaments have forged a role for themselves that was unforeseen in the Lisbon Treaty: weighing in on the policy-making and the ratification processes. In Europe, parliamentary assertion reflected the twin impact of a changing global trade agenda and the centralization of the EU trade policy regime.

Brexit under Scrutiny in EU Member States: What Role for National Parliaments in Austria and Germany?

“…Putting it another way, MPs may invest political resources because they calculate domestic, material costs arising from a certain issue. Secondly, the article contributes to research on NPs in the negotiation of EU international agreements on which only a handful of studies exists so far (Jančić, 2017;Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). Having traced NPs' involvement in Brexit affairs, the results of this article confirm the relevance of saliency for parliaments' activities within the realm of EU international negotiations.…”

“…This is part of a larger trend whereby NPs actively scrutinize EU affairs due to their upgraded role since the Lisbon Treaty (Cooper, 2012). Through mechanisms such as the Barroso initiative, inter-parliamentary cooperation, and scrutiny of national governments NPs have become increasingly assertive of their roles in the negotiation of EU international agreements (Jančić, 2017;Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). While NPs obviously have no right to ratification on the Article 50 agreement, they can make use of the aforementioned instruments in the withdrawal negotiations.…”

“…Recent research shows, however, that there is considerable variation in parliamentary activities on EU affairs between NPs (Auel & Christiansen, 2015;Winzen, 2012). This seems to apply to their engagement in EU international negotiations, too (Jančić, 2017;Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). Regarding trade talks, parliaments in Austria and Germany vis-à-vis other NPs in the EU recently stood out as intensive scrutinizers of transatlantic agreements such as CETA.…”

Europe’s Crises: Preparing to Study Disintegration

“…Similarly, plans of the TTIP and its little brother the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU envisioning wide spanning regulatory cooperation saw tens of thousands take to the street across European capitals. Quite simply, the move to more regulatory measures in trade making has meant that anti-trade groups have an easier job at problematising trade and galvanising public discourse (Laursen & Roederer-Rynning 2017;Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup 2017).…”

Revisiting the European Convention: the origins of the EP veto over international commercial treaties

“…This rule change has had far-reaching consequences. Trade negotiations have arguably become more transparent and accountable through the involvement and activism of the EP, as evidenced by recent high-profile negotiations with Canada and the U.S. (Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). And while it has been argued that the EP's increased role in the CCP was indeed the result of a desire to balance the efficiency oriented CCP with more direct input legitimacy during the Constitutional Convention (Krajewski, 2013;Van den Putte et al, 2015) there has been limited attention dedicated towards the question of how exactly the EP came to obtain its veto power in the first place.…”