National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Welch, Ryan M.

doi:10.1080/14754835.2015.1103166

Cited by 25 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Despite buy-in from the United Nations and NGOs such as Amnesty International, most human rights scholars remain slow to consider NHRIs in their arguments and models. Joining others that show that NHRIs can reduce repression (Cole and Ramirez, 2013; Welch, 2017) and that international government organizations work hard to get states to adopt NHRIs (Kim, 2013), this paper suggests that domestic publics and governments also take seriously the possible effects of NHRIs. Future work should heed Cardenas’s (2012: 31–32) call to perform more systematic research on NHRIs in order to answer questions about the design and effectiveness of NHRIs, and human rights institutions as a whole.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Frye, 1997; Shugart, 2006; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Lastly, the paper adds to the nascent, but growing quantitative NHRI literature (Cole and Ramirez, 2013; Kim, 2013; Koo and Ramirez, 2009; Welch, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…However, some NHRIs actually possess the legal power to punish violators and those agents interfering in their work with fines and imprisonment. While no published research exists directly testing the effect of NHRI punishment, 3 the literature shows NHRI presence can reduce repression (Cole and Ramirez, 2013; Welch, 2017). Taken with the result that institutional enforcement mechanisms increase the costs of non-compliance (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Welch

2017

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Welch

2017

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Moreover, the effectiveness of human rights treaties implementation in Southeast Asia is stalled by the limited number of national human rights institutions in each of member states (Clarke 2012 ). Thus, in correlation to Welch ( 2017 ) and Cole and Ramirez ( 2013 ), the limited number of NHRIs in Southeast Asia in comparison to the Western countries and the challenges they face above affected the respect towards human rights in general.…”

Section: Key Factors Of Human Rights Implementation: Southeast Asia Vmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…One study conducted by Welch ( 2017 ) shows the significance of NHRIs in implementing human rights treaties. Using statistical data from 153 countries from 1981 to 2007, Welch pointed that the presence of NHRI in countries that ratified UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) has fundamentally decreased the chances of the states to violate human rights by practicing torture.…”

Section: Key Factors Of Human Rights Implementation: Southeast Asia Vmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting international human rights treaties: comparing Asian and Western efforts to improve human rights

Ahdanisa

Rothman

2020

SN Soc Sci

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The Conditional Effectiveness of Soft Law: Compliance with the Decisions of the Committee against Torture

Staden

2022

Hum Rights Rev

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The article examines the record of compliance with the UN Committee against Torture’s decisions in individual complaints cases. Theoretically, I expect that compliance will be the outcome of a combination of normative and rationalist factors: States committed to human rights protection will comply even in the absence of enforcement but only as long as compliance costs remain relatively low. Using a data set covering all adverse decisions issued until 2018 and information on their compliance status, I employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcomes of compliance and noncompliance. The analysis reveals that the conditions tested—liberal democracy, nonuse of political terror, violation type, and strong civil society—are in part individually (near-)necessary and jointly sufficient for compliance, while the presence of their complements is consistent with noncompliance. The Committee against Torture thus appears to be able to elicit (some) state compliance with its decisions, if mostly only with respect to certain kinds of states and select types of violations.

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National Human Rights Institutions: Domestic implementation of international human rights law

Cited by 25 publications

References 68 publications

Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Revisiting international human rights treaties: comparing Asian and Western efforts to improve human rights

The Conditional Effectiveness of Soft Law: Compliance with the Decisions of the Committee against Torture

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