Nash networks with heterogeneous links

Haller, Hans; Sarangi, Sudipta

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.02.003

Cited by 106 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…There is a cost borne by u to establishing such a link, and a profit for the information which u learns through this link. This research explores properties of the social network which forms under this scenario [5,16].…”

Section: Game-theoretic Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information diffusion through blogspace

Gruhl

Guha

Liben-Nowell

et al. 2004

Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on World Wide Web

946

610

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We study the dynamics of information propagation in environments of low-overhead personal publishing, using a large collection of weblogs over time as our example domain. We characterize and model this collection at two levels. First, we present a macroscopic characterization of topic propagation through our corpus, formalizing the notion of long-running "chatter" topics consisting recursively of "spike" topics generated by outside world events, or more rarely, by resonances within the community. Second, we present a microscopic characterization of propagation from individual to individual, drawing on the theory of infectious diseases to model the flow. We propose, validate, and employ an algorithm to induce the underlying propagation network from a sequence of posts, and report on the results.

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Section: Game-theoretic Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information diffusion through blogspace

Gruhl

Guha

Liben-Nowell

et al. 2004

Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on World Wide Web

946

610

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Let ∆ g i = {j : g ij = 1 and g ji = 1} be the set of agents with whom player i has double links in network g. Each double link imposes a small positive penalty ε > 0 (ε ¿ min{V i }) on both players. 12 Note that the penalty needs to be imposed on both players as strategies are chosen simultaneously.…”

Section: Property Lementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This leads to the super-connected networks. Therefore it is also not surprising that in Haller and Sarangi (2001) where links can have different failure probabilities, such super-connected networks may not arise. Alternatively as the cost of information increases with distance, i.e., expected indirect beneÞts decrease when the size of society increases as in Bala and Goyal (2000b), super-connected networks will emerge.…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The structure of information networks

2005

Self Cite

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We develop a model of information acquisition in a network where agents pay for all the information they acquire including those through indirect links. The cost of information depends on the value of the information itself and the distance it traverses in the network. We Þnd that when the costs of information increase with distance, the complete network is the only Nash network. When cost of information decreases with distance or delay, all equilibrium information networks are minimally connected, though not all trees are Nash. We analyze the popular star and chain networks and identify strict Nash networks. We show that there is almost no divergence between the efficient and equilibrium information networks. We explore the implications of a spatial model and information decay and discuss the relationship with experimental evidence.JEL ClassiÞcation: D82, D83

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“…I focus on equilibria in which there exists at least one non-singleton component. 11 Proposition 4.1: Let (3)-(4) be satisfied. A connected strict equilibrium is either an ordered wheel or an ordered flower where player 1 is the center.…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-Way Flow Networks: The Role of Heterogeneity

Galeotti

2004

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity * Andrea Galeotti † Terms of use: Documents in March 2004Abstract I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may emerge. Second, I show that non-singleton components have a wheel architecture as far as the costs of linking are not partner specific. Otherwise also the flower architecture constitutes an equilibrium. I interpret these results as saying that symmetric connections across players are a peculiar feature of homogenous environments; by contrast, in heterogeneous settings players hold asymmetric connections which are accompanied by the emergence of central players.

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Nash networks with heterogeneous links

Cited by 106 publications

References 6 publications

Information diffusion through blogspace

Information diffusion through blogspace

The structure of information networks

One-Way Flow Networks: The Role of Heterogeneity

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