Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

Abstract

We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then all social choice functions can be implemented in strictly dominant strategies by a mechanism which does not use "integer/modulo games". We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation in the two-person case, and describe some implications of these characterization conditions. * We are most grateful to M.Kandori, N.Kartik, H.Matsushima and T.Sjostrom for discussions and helpful comments. We are particularly indebted to two anonymous referees of the journal for remarkably insightful and detailed comments.† Dutta is in the

A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

“…For example, Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) introduce the notion of partial honesty in implementation theory and consider Nash implementation problems with partially-honest agents. A partially-honest agent is an agent who has preferences over message profiles and displays concerns for two dimensions in lexicographic order: (1) her outcome and (2) her truthtelling behavior.…”

“…Let R (X) be the set of all complete preorders on X. 3 We assume that R n ≡ R 1 × ... × R n is a non-empty subset of the n-fold Cartesian product…”

“…An element of R n is denoted by 2 Note that the forthrightness condition is indispensable for showing Theorem 1, a main result of this paper. 3 A complete preorder R ∈ R (X) is a complete and transitive binary relation. A relation R on X is complete if, for all x, x 0 ∈ X, (x, x 0 ) ∈ R or (x 0 , x) ∈ R; transitive if, for all x, x 0 , x 00 ∈ X, if (x, x 0 ) ∈ R and (x 0 , x 00 ) ∈ R , then (x, x 00 ) ∈ R.…”

Implementation with partial provability

“…In any case, given our other assumptions, our results do not depend on whether we allow SP to forbid some messages or not. 9 Hence for simplicity, we assume he cannot.…”

Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments with Free-Disposal

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AbstractWe study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al, 1996(Saijo et al, , 1999 where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty.

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