Naïve realism and phenomenal overlap

Morgan, Jonathan Brink

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0753-9

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…BPS DCP has subsequently developed the Power Threat Meaning Framework as a psychological alternative to psychiatric diagnosis (Johnstone and Boyle, 2018). Although the framework is popular among certain communities highly critical of psychiatry, it has largely been ignored by clinicians given its shortcomings (Morgan, 2023), and in particular, the framework is virtually unknown in the United States (Raskin et al, 2022).…”

Section: Proposals To Eliminate Psychiatric Diagnosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychiatric Diagnosis

Aftab,

Banicki,

Ruffalo

et al. 2024

J Nerv Ment Dis

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The controversies surrounding the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Diseases have generated significant debate across the psy-sciences. This debate has been further fueled by the launch of the Research Domain Criteria as a framework to facilitate advances in neuroscientific research, a renewed emphasis on dimensional models of psychopathology, currently exemplified by the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology, and development of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual by the psychodynamic community. In this article, we provide a clinical overview of recent debates surrounding categorical and dimensional approaches to psychiatric diagnosis, offer a critical assessment of proposed alternatives, and discuss how clinicians can navigate a plurality of diagnostic frameworks. Our discussion emphasizes that diagnostic frameworks need to be contextualized within the process of a comprehensive clinical evaluation, and their advantages and disadvantages should be understood in relationship to the theoretical orientations and practical needs of clinicians.

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Section: Proposals To Eliminate Psychiatric Diagnosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychiatric Diagnosis

Aftab,

Banicki,

Ruffalo

et al. 2024

J Nerv Ment Dis

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What Does Phenomenal Particularity Commit Us to?

Ali

2024

Synthese Library

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Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity

Clarke

Anaya²

2019

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It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn't make phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently.

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Naïve realism and phenomenal overlap

Cited by 3 publications

References 13 publications

Psychiatric Diagnosis

Psychiatric Diagnosis

What Does Phenomenal Particularity Commit Us to?

Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity

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