Nagel's Atlas

Julius, A. J.

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00061.x

Cited by 103 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…For the purpose of my present argument, I am neither committed to a particular metric (I do for example remain neutral on how principles of distributive justice should incorporate considerations of responsibility and choice), nor do I insist on a particularly strict conception of equality (the principle of maximin should for example be considered as egalitarian in the wide sense currently relevant). 2 There are various relationalist positions prominent in the current literature, see for example: Blake (2001), James (2005), Julius (2006). I am specifically concerned with relationalism about egalitarian distributive justice and focus on views that have not yet received extensive treatment.…”

Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing, Reciprocity and the Grounds of Egalitarian Justice

Wollner

2010

Res Publica

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John Rawls famously claims that 'justice is the first virtue of social institutions'. On one of its readings, this remark seems to suggest that social institutions are essential for obligations of justice to arise. The spirit of this interpretation has recently sparked a new debate about the grounds of justice. What are the conditions that generate principles of distributive justice? I am interested in a specific version of this question. What conditions generate egalitarian principles of distributive justice and give rise to equality as a demand of justice? My paper focuses on relationalist answers to this question. Advocates of relationalism assume that 'principles of distributive justice have a relational basis', in the sense that 'practice mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope and justification of those principles'. To say that principles of justice are 'based' on and 'conditioned' by practice mediated relations is ambiguous. I will here be concerned with advocates of what I call the relationalist requirement, viz. positions which assume that 'practice mediated relations' constitute a necessary existence condition for principles of egalitarian distributive justice. Relationalists who endorse this view come in different varieties. My focus is on relationalists that view social and political institutions as the relevant 'practice mediated relation'. The question at stake, then, is this: Are institutionally mediated relations a necessary condition for equality to arise as a demand of justice? Strong relationalists of the institutionalist cast, call them advocates of the institutionalist requirement, differ in important respects. They argue about what set of institutions is foundationally significant, and they disagree on why only that institutional relation gives rise to egalitarian obligations of justice. My paper engages two ways of arguing for the institutionalist requirement: Julius's framing argument and Andrea Sangiovanni's reciprocity argument. The issue at stake are the grounds of egalitarian justice and I will argue that the institutionalist requirement is mistaken. It is not the case that

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Section: Preliminary Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing, Reciprocity and the Grounds of Egalitarian Justice

Wollner

2010

Res Publica

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“…Philosophers sympathetic to both global duties of justice and membership dependence have sought responses to these questions. Some advocate applying egalitarian principles separately to both domestic societies and global institutions, allowing increasing coverage of global principles as global institutions become increasingly more economically important (Julius 2006). This approach seems to recommend limiting the focus to only those inequalities caused by emerging global economic institutions as the institutions emerge.…”

Section: Egalitarian Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keynote Address to the Third International Global Ethics Association, 30 June 2010, Bristol Human dignity, respect, and global inequality

Moellendorf

2010

Journal of Global Ethics

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“…A number of theorists (Julius 2006;Blake and Risse 2006;Cohen and Sabel 2006;Sangiovanni 2007) have since pointed out that of course there also other forms of justice to be maintained in the international order. They accept Nagel's insight that the enforcement mechanisms of the state have a special status and require a special form of justice, because there is no other set of rules that is so pervasive and has such a direct effect on the daily lives of citizens.…”

Section: Conclusion: Taking the Political Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%