Myanmar: Surveillance and the Turn from Authoritarianism?

Abstract

In Myanmar, one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world (1962—2011) exerting unrestrained coercion and relying on a pervasive security apparatus, has accepted a constitution and competitive elections. The military directed concatenation of developments but especially the Constitution that legalizes a unique power-sharing arrangement between the military and the elected government, contribute to the exceptionalism but also continuing coercion of Myanmar’s military, even under the democratically elected popular government of former democracy icons Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Holding that a key step in a democratic transition must involve the scaling down of state coercive apparatus, the article demonstrates how this has not been the case in Myanmar. The size, expenditure and revenues of the armed forces have been maintained, the surveillance for political and social control continues, while the spread of mobile communication devices, and particularly social media, has opened up more extensive and easier opportunities for monitoring. Subjugating the practices of surveillance to laws is not prioritized in the complex political context of multiple pressing issues.

In the Absence of the Rule of Law: Everyday Lawyering, Dignity and Resistance in Myanmar’s ‘Disciplined Democracy’

“…However, events since the 2015 elections have confirmed that both the practice and culture of authoritarianism persist, which naturally have a chilling effect upon the emergence of the rule of law (McCarthy, 2018). The military have preserved and even enhanced their ‘coercive apparatus’ of surveillance and monopoly on force and violence (Dean, 2017), confirming what scholars had earlier suspected (Jones, 2014a, 2014b) that this was not so much a transition to full democracy but rather to a hybrid regime. Full democratization, if it can ever be achieved, now appears a long-distant prospect (Bünte, 2016; Dean, 2017; Huang, 2017).…”

“…Corruption within the courts persists largely unchecked, and the poor state of legal education has been a problem for decades (Crouch, 2019; Zan, 2008). 4 As for the legislature, both modern and colonial-era laws are drafted and/or interpreted to stymie a debate that might otherwise result in a restraint on arbitrary state power (Crouch in Harding and Oo, 2017: 160–164; Dean, 2017: 501–502; IBAHRI, 2012; ICJ, 2013; ILAC/CEELI, 2014; Mon, 2016; Prasse-Freeman, 2016; Slow, 2016).…”

“…The recent literature emphasizes how none among the Constitutional Tribunal, the Anti-Corruption Commission or the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission are able to operate as a system of meaningful checks and balances (Nardi in Harding and Oo, 2017: 173–191; Quah, 2016; Renshaw, 2017: 215–234; Saw, 2015). Widespread impunity reigns at every level for crimes committed by state and military officials, whether these abuses are events of international significance (such as the violent expulsion of more than 600,000 ethnic Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State (Amnesty International, 2017; Smith, 2013; MacManus et al, 2015)) or take place at a persistent, everyday level (such as mistreatment or murder of journalists and activists: Cheesman et al, 2016) In addition to such lack of accountability for executive and military overreach, power is also exercised with insufficient clarity or predictability, through the erratic and punitive interpretation of both modern and colonial-era legislation (Dean, 2017: 501).…”

“…Yet the response of the authorities to such direct challenges has always been swift and brutal (Smith, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Even in the years immediately after the 2015 elections, when civil society and the international community pushed for a political reorientation towards rights and a ‘democratic’ rule of law, the Myanmar establishment responded by more surveillance, suppression of peaceful protest and increased prosecutions for criminal defamation (Dean, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2016).…”

New data infrastructures for environmental monitoring in Myanmar: Is digital transparency good for governance?

“…6 Expanded internet access and subsequent proliferation of digital tools and platforms can enable broader participation of non-state actors, including in resource governance. At the same time, in a country with an entrenched military bureaucracy, these changes bring with them threats of continued state surveillance (Dean, 2017). Myanmar's valuable natural resources, including land, teak, jade, rubies, oil and gas, and hydropower, have long been controlled by military generals, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), and well-connected cronies (Buchanan et al, 2013;Ferguson, 2014).…”