2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.010
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My way: How strategic preferences vary by negotiator role and regulatory focus

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Cited by 46 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…Instead of suggesting that individuals in a prevention focus are more prosocial or less concerned with self-interest than those in a promotion focus, our findings suggest that the self-interest concerns of individuals in a promotion or prevention focus manifest in different forms -i.e., in distinct concerns with absolute or relative outcomes. Further, these findings suggest some additional consequences of regulatory focus that have not been previously explored within the domain of negotiations (Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009;Appelt & Higgins, 2010). For example, because of their concern with relative outcomes, negotiators with a prevention focus may be more likely to make the potentially false fixed-pie assumption, in which negotiators assume that the more value they accumulate at the bargaining table, the less other party receives (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).…”
Section: Regulatory Focus and Economic Interdependence 18mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Instead of suggesting that individuals in a prevention focus are more prosocial or less concerned with self-interest than those in a promotion focus, our findings suggest that the self-interest concerns of individuals in a promotion or prevention focus manifest in different forms -i.e., in distinct concerns with absolute or relative outcomes. Further, these findings suggest some additional consequences of regulatory focus that have not been previously explored within the domain of negotiations (Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, 2009;Appelt & Higgins, 2010). For example, because of their concern with relative outcomes, negotiators with a prevention focus may be more likely to make the potentially false fixed-pie assumption, in which negotiators assume that the more value they accumulate at the bargaining table, the less other party receives (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).…”
Section: Regulatory Focus and Economic Interdependence 18mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Negotiation research clearly establishes that people negotiate differently depending on the organization they serve, which determines their role in the negotiation (Appelt and Higgins, 2010;McCracken et al, 2011).…”
Section: The Circularity Between Strategy and Negotiationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Past research has shown that the cognitive frames of buyers and sellers differ. Though both buyers and sellers focus on what they will forgo in a negotiation, typically money for buyers versus a certain object for sellers (Carmon & Ariely, ), recent research has shown that these roles involve different regulatory strategies, such that the buyer role maps onto a prevention regulatory focus (prevention of loss), whereas the seller role maps onto a promotion regulatory focus (promotion of gains) (Appelt & Higgins, ; Appelt, Zou, Arora, & Higgins, ). Given these considerations for negotiation roles, we predict that role should matter, in particular for the effect of attachment avoidance.…”
Section: Attachment Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%