Mutual misconceptions between designers and operators of hazardous systems

Busby, J S; Hibberd, Ralph

doi:10.1007/s00163-002-0012-2

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…It is the potential non-alignment of assumptions with actual build or operating processes that increases the risk of accidents during construction or operation (Busby and Hibberd, 2002; Sharit, 1997). Items were summed to form an index (i.e.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Complex design engineering decisions also involve gathering and elaborating relevant knowledge about the likely future behaviour of both those who construct or manufacture the design (henceforth constructors) and end users that operate the design (Dekker, 2005; Konda et al, 1992). However, engineers may not fully understand how constructors and end users behave (Busby and Hibberd, 2002) and there often is little or no contact between engineers and those that bear the safety risks of engineers’ actions (Dekker, 2005; Toole and Gambatese, 2008). This may lead to design engineers building inaccurate or incomplete models of constructors’ and end users’ behaviour, leading to decisions that may increase risk to others and which then may become embedded in the design (Busby and Hibberd, 2002; Sharit, 1997).…”

Section: Design Engineering Safety Climate Time Pressures and Increased Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, engineers may not fully understand how constructors and end users behave (Busby and Hibberd, 2002) and there often is little or no contact between engineers and those that bear the safety risks of engineers’ actions (Dekker, 2005; Toole and Gambatese, 2008). This may lead to design engineers building inaccurate or incomplete models of constructors’ and end users’ behaviour, leading to decisions that may increase risk to others and which then may become embedded in the design (Busby and Hibberd, 2002; Sharit, 1997).…”

Section: Design Engineering Safety Climate Time Pressures and Increased Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Safety climate and increased risk: The role of deadlines in design work

et al. 2016

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Although much research indicates positive safety climate is associated with reduced safety risk, we argue this association is not universal and may even be reversed in some contexts. Specifically, we argue that positive safety climate can be associated with increased safety risk when there is pressure to prioritize production over safety and where workers have some detachment from the consequences of their actions, such as found in engineering design work. We used two indicators of safety risk: use of heuristics at the individual level and design complexity at the design team level. Using experience sampling data ( N = 165, 42 design teams, k = 5752 observations), we found design engineers’ perceptions of team positive safety climate were associated with less use of heuristics when engineers were not working to deadlines, but more use of heuristics when engineers were working to deadlines. Independent ratings were obtained of 31 teams’ designs of offshore oil and gas platforms ( N = 121). For teams that worked infrequently to deadlines, positive team safety climate was associated with less design complexity. For teams that worked frequently to deadlines, positive team safety climate was associated with more design complexity.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Design Engineering Safety Climate Time Pressures and Increased Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Design Engineering Safety Climate Time Pressures and Increased Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Safety climate and increased risk: The role of deadlines in design work

et al. 2016

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“…Taking into account what those who have attempted to describe the epistemology of engineering have had to say (Koen 1985, Bella 1987, Vaughan 1996, Busby 2003, Kerr 2008, we are led to two conclusions. First, the epistemological gap that Bader and Nyce describe between ethnography and engineering does exist.…”

Section: The First Move: Towards a Cartography Of Epistemologiesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…This process should also take into account (and reflect) the sum of expectations derived from all the stakeholders involved in that particular engineering project. However, this may not always be possible due to any number of factors like miscommunication, misconceptions or simply a lack of information (Busby 2003), or, as Vaughan (1996, p. 196) believes, because engineering have 'a worldview that survives despite evidence that repeatedly challenges it basic assumptions'.…”

Section: Reduces All This To His Rule Of Engineeringmentioning

confidence: 99%