Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols for Roaming Services in Wireless Mobile Networks

Abstract

Abstract-Two novel mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with anonymity are proposed for different roaming scenarios in the global mobility network. The new features in the proposed protocols include identity anonymity and one-time session key renewal. Identity anonymity protects mobile users privacy in the roaming network environment. One-time session key progression frequently renews the session key for mobile users and reduces the risk of using a compromised session key to communicate with visited networks. It has demonstrated that the computation complexity of the proposed protocols is similar to the existing ones, while the security has been significantly improved.

SEGR: A secure and efficient group roaming scheme for machine to machine communications between 3GPP and WiMAX networks

“…When a group of MTC devices roam from 3GPP network to WiMAX network which belongs to different operator domains, or vice versa, the access authentication must be performed by the corresponding access networks which are regulated by their respective home authentication servers. Numerous authentication protocols dedicated for 3GPP-WLAN or WiMAX-WLAN interworking architecture have been proposed, such as [5], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. However, there is few research work dealing with authentication issues for 3GPP-WiMAX interworking architecture; moreover, most of the existing protocols are based on symmetric cryptosystem (e.g., EAP-based authentication and key agreement).…”

Design and Validation of an Efficient Authentication Scheme with Anonymity for Roaming Service in Global Mobility Networks

“…Upon receiving the registration request, HA generates a secret m-bits random number N MU for MU and records the mapping relation of MU's pseudonym identity PID MU and N MU (PID MU ↔ N MU ). The concept of the pseudonym identity is firstly introduced in [13]. To defeat the exhaustive search attack, m should be sufficiently large, e.g., 256 bits.…”

Credit-Based User Authentication for Delay Tolerant Mobile Wireless Networks

“…The MT is preapproved to use the network resources of the FA when the message reaches the BH, or eventually the FA, that has the credit record. The BH and the FA decrypt Message (7) Depending on which has the authentication record first, the BH sends both the MT and the FA or the FA sends the MT Message (8), and the MT starts to send data in Message (9). After the FA grants the access of the MT, the FA continues step 2 and step 3 mentioned earlier to authenticate the MT with the HA.…”

“…User anonymity and intractability are important security property, which can be achieved by adopting similar user identity replacement proposed in [9] at signalling level in the proposed authentication with jointly using other privacy hiding techniques at Internet Protocol (IP) and Medium Access Control (MAC) levels.…”