Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good*

Branco, Fernando A.

doi:10.1007/s001990050078

Cited by 20 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…(=)) Here we use the fact that Incentive compatibility implies (b). A result in Krishna and Maenner (2001) then implies (3). By the convexity of V i , we know that @V i is monotone, so:…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…The answer is not obvious since the developer does not know company A's cost parameter, so it does not know which alternative "hurts more." 3 In this paper we show that the optimal threat is to tell A that in the event it does not participate, the seller keeps the invention with probability 1 2 , and makes it open source with probability 1 2 . Faced with this lottery, then company A always participates, and more importantly at the revenue maximizing mechanism is ALWAYS awarded the invention at a price of $450,000.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…If the payo¤ from open sourcing did not depend on A 0 s cost parameter, the seller could have generated more revenue, but the allocation of the invention at the optimal mechanism would be identical and as ine¢ cient, as in the case where open sourcing were not an option. 4 This example 3 Both of these threats are credible. In case …rm A does not participate in the sale, the seller in this example is indi¤erent between keeping the invention and making it open source.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

Figueroa

Skreta

2008

SSRN Journal

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We characterize the revenue maximizing allocation mechanism for a risk neutral seller that owns N , possibly heterogeneous, objects and faces I risk neutral buyers with very general preferences, which allow for complements, substitutes and externalities. Buyers care about the entire allocation of the objects, even if they do not win any, so the auction outcome may a¤ect them also when they do not to participate, and these non-participation payo¤s may very well depend on their type. The main novel message of our analysis is that with type-dependent non-participation payo¤s, the revenue maximizing assignment of objects can crucially depend on the outside options that buyers face. Outside options can therefore a¤ect the degree of e¢ ciency of revenue maximizing auctions. We show that sometimes an optimal mechanism will allocate the objects in an ex-post e¢ cient way, and other times buyers will obtain objects more often than it is e¢ cient. Our characterization rings a bell of caution. Modeling buyers' outside options as being independent of their private information, is with loss of generality and can lead to quite misleading intuitions.

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“…(=)) Here we use the fact that Incentive compatibility implies (b). A result in Krishna and Maenner (2001) then implies (3). By the convexity of V i , we know that @V i is monotone, so:…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

Figueroa

Skreta

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…This is the market clearing price, set by the controller. Furthermore, 12) namely the allocated amount to each user is proportional to its bid [54]. Therefore, socially optimal resource allocation can be achieved by bidding (where each user's bid is a single number), and an appropriate charging scheme.…”

Section: Proportional Allocation Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The single-item optimal auction introduced by Myerson, was later extended for one perfectly divisible item by Maskin, [69], and for the case of multiple homogeneous items by Branco,[12]. We will focus on the latter mechanism.…”

Section: Optimal Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spectrum and storage capacity management using network economics and optimization methods

Ιωσηφίδης¹

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An Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems

Zhang

Niyato

Wang

2013

Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications

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A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use storage from different places) that they have similar functions to the users. On the other hand, some resources are complementary that the user will need them as a bundle (e.g., users need both wireless connection and storage for online photo posting). In this paper, we first model the resource allocation process of a mobile cloud computing system as an auction mechanism with premium and discount factors. The premium and discount factors indicate complementary and substitutable relations among cloud resources provided by the service provider. Then, we analyze the individual rationality and incentive compatibility (truthfulness) properties of the users in the proposed auction mechanism. The optimal solutions of the resource allocation and cost charging schemes in the auction mechanism is discussed afterwards.

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Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good*

Cited by 20 publications

References 0 publications

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design

Spectrum and storage capacity management using network economics and optimization methods

An Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems

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