Multiple pollutants, co-benefits, and suboptimal environmental policies

Fullerton, Don; Karney, Daniel H.

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.003

Cited by 40 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…4 Ambec and Coria (2013) analyze a mix of tax and permit policies under uncertainty and determine the optimal policy depending on the substitutability or complementarity of pollutants. Montero (2001), Caplan and Silva (2005), Fullerton and Karney (2018), Stranlund and Son (2019), and Ambec and Coria (2018) in different contexts to ours, also stress that the implementation of different policy instruments may yield different outcomes, and highlight the necessity of joint regulation. More specifically, Ambec and Coria (2018) argue that efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions do not necessarily lead to a reduction of local pollutants.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 54%

On the Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution

Antoniou

Kyriakopoulou

2019

Environ Resource Econ

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We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete à la Cournot in a third market in the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced: a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. We illustrate that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of tradable emission permits instead of non-tradable ones then a new strategic effect appears which has not been identified thus far. In this case, local pollution increases further. We caution that linking permit markets across regions may be welfare detrimental. We also provide evidence from the implementation of EU ETS over the pollution of particulate matters (PM 10 and PM 2.5).

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 54%

On the Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution

Antoniou

Kyriakopoulou

2019

Environ Resource Econ

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“…This paper takes climate policy objectives as a starting point, but long-term strategies to be submitted by 2020 in accordance with Article 4 (Paragraph 19) of the Paris Agreement can reach benefits beyond those presented here when an integrated policy is designed explicitly to balance trade-offs and ancillary benefits from the outset. Effective policymaking should therefore account for multiple externalities in the pricing of food and energy 62 , consider the interplay of various policy design features, such as taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms 63 , and cover a broad range of pollutants, including short-lived climate forcers 64 – 68 . Future research should aim to show how policies that provide the right market incentives for technology trade-offs can exploit synergies and avoid lock-in effects in infrastructure by combining effective short-term air pollution control measures with an ambitious decarbonisation roadmap to maximise benefits for climate and human health simultaneously.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Air quality co-benefits for human health and agriculture counterbalance costs to meet Paris Agreement pledges

et al. 2018

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Local air quality co-benefits can provide complementary support for ambitious climate action and can enable progress on related Sustainable Development Goals. Here we show that the transformation of the energy system implied by the emission reduction pledges brought forward in the context of the Paris Agreement on climate change (Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs) substantially reduces local air pollution across the globe. The NDCs could avoid between 71 and 99 thousand premature deaths annually in 2030 compared to a reference case, depending on the stringency of direct air pollution controls. A more ambitious 2 °C-compatible pathway raises the number of avoided premature deaths from air pollution to 178–346 thousand annually in 2030, and up to 0.7–1.5 million in the year 2050. Air quality co-benefits on morbidity, mortality, and agriculture could globally offset the costs of climate policy. An integrated policy perspective is needed to maximise benefits for climate and health.

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“…Earlier studies-although focusing mainly on the interplay between greenhouse gases and air pollutants-have, for example, identified that strategic corporate behaviour in emission permit markets might lead to cost inefficiencies (Dickson and MacKenzie 2018). It is also identified that the choice between an emission tax and permit instruments on different pollutants in a multi-pollutant system might have welfare impacts, where the key determinant is whether the pollutants are complements or substitutes (Ambec and Coria 2013;Fullerton and Karney 2018). Furthermore, also related to our results, Ambec and Coria (2018) and Antoniou and Kyriakopoulou (2015) show how the best choice of instruments is affected by the geographical dispersion of emissions and the national/international structure of governance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment perspectives on costs for air pollution control affect the optimal use of emission control measures

Åström

Kiesewetter

Schöpp

et al. 2018

Clean Techn Environ Policy

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Cost-effective air pollution emission control has been in focus for decades in international air pollution regulations. Despite large observed emission reductions for many air pollutants, environmental and human health problems persist and more efforts are needed. However, some stakeholders are concerned that the costs for remaining emission control measures are prohibitively high. There are several reasons for concern, and one can be the difference in investment perspectives-i.e. costs of borrowing and time constraints-held by stakeholders. By using the integrated assessment model GAINS, we study whether differences in investment perspectives of Nordic stakeholders influence measures selected for cost-effective emission control and can motivate concerns for high costs of emission control. We distinguish the control cost calculations between a social planner perspective and a corporate perspective and apply these to the GAINS model database on emission control measures. A cost-minimized selection of measures in 2030 is then calculated for increasing environmental and health ambitions for both perspectives. The results show an irregular pattern, but for a range of ambition levels the corporate perspective affects the selection of measures and implies surplus costs for the Nordic social planner of up to 120 million € per year. This is 36% more expensive than the costs of the social planners' selection. Conversely, from a corporate perspective the social planners' selection can imply cost increases of up to 180 million €. We therefore suggest that control of investment perspective effects should be standard in analysis of cost-effective air pollution measures.

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Multiple pollutants, co-benefits, and suboptimal environmental policies

Cited by 40 publications

References 26 publications

On the Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution

On the Strategic Effect of International Permits Trading on Local Pollution

Air quality co-benefits for human health and agriculture counterbalance costs to meet Paris Agreement pledges

Investment perspectives on costs for air pollution control affect the optimal use of emission control measures

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