Multiple access game with a cognitive jammer

Khalil, Karim; Ekici, Eylem

doi:10.1109/acssc.2012.6489252

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…This has motivated extensive research on jamming in CNRs [1]- [5]. Further, as both the cognitive radio enabled secondary users and jammers have autonomy and flexible control over their unlicensed band transmissions, game theory has emerged as a powerful tool to investigate anti-jamming radio communications [6]- [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

User-Centric View of Jamming Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Xiao

Liu

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

110

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Jamming games between a cognitive radio enabled secondary user (SU) and a cognitive radio enabled jammer are considered, in which end-user decision making is modeled using prospect theory (PT). More specifically, the interactions between a user and a smart jammer regarding their respective choices of transmit power are formulated as a game under the assumption that end-user decision making under uncertainty does not follow the traditional objective assumptions stipulated by expected utility theory, but rather follows the subjective deviations specified by PT. Two PT-based static jamming games are formulated to describe how subjective SU and jammer choose their transmit power to maximize their individual signal-to-interference-plusnoise ratio (SINR)-based utilities under uncertainties regarding the opponent's actions and channel states, respectively. The Nash equilibria of the games are presented under various channel models and transmission costs. Moreover, a PT-based dynamic jamming game is presented to investigate the long-term interactions between a subjective and smart jammer according to a Markov decision process with uncertainty on the SU's future actions and channel variations. Simulation results show that the subjective view of an SU tends to exaggerate the jamming probabilities and decreases its transmission probability, thus reducing the average SINR. On the other hand, the subjectivity of a jammer tends to reduce its jamming probability and thus increases the SU throughput.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

User-Centric View of Jamming Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Xiao

Liu

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This has motivated extensive research studies on jamming [1]- [5]. Further, as both secondary users and jammers have autonomy and flexible control over their unlicensed band transmissions, game theory has emerged as a powerful tool to investigate anti-jamming radio communications [6]- [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospect theoretic analysis of anti-jamming communications in cognitive radio networks

Xiao

Liu

et al. 2014

2014 IEEE Global Communications Conference

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An anti-jamming communication game between a cognitive radio enabled secondary user (SU) and a cognitive radio enabled jammer is considered, in which end-user decision making is modeled using prospect theory (PT). More specifically, the interactions between a user and a smart jammer (i.e., their respective choices of transmission probability) are formulated as a game under the assumption that end-user decision making under uncertainty does not follow the traditional objective assumptions stipulated by expected utility theory (EUT), but rather follows the subjective deviations specified by PT. Under the assumption that the capacity of the system is governed by the primary user activity, the Nash equilibria of the game are characterized under various conditions and the impact of the players' subjectivity (deviation from EUT behavior) on the SU's throughput is measured. Simulation results show that the subjective view of an SU tends to exaggerate the jamming probabilities and decreases its transmission probability, thus reducing the average throughput. On the other hand, the subjectivity of a jammer tends to reduce its jamming probability and thus increases the SU throughput. ) + u S (0, 0) u S (1, 0). (23)Proof: As both players are objective, i.e., ↵ S = ↵ J = 1, by (18), we have. (25) Similarly, we can obtain p ⇤ J,0 as in (23). V. SIMULATION RESULTSWe performed simulations to evaluate the impact of the users' objective weights ↵ x in (4) on the performance of the NE strategy described above in the PT-based anti-jamming communication game. We present the average utilities of both players, U EUT S and U EUT J , as given by (2) and (3). In addition, we also computed the average throughput of the SU, denoted with ⌅, which can be written as

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“…The eavesdropper secondary users (ESUs) threaten the primary system by eavesdropping primary traffic when it is not granted spectrum access to communicate with the primary station (PS). A unique type of security attack, Threaten to access in CRN was recently introduced in [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, helps the PS to characterize the optimal ESU spectrum access rule to improve secure rate of the PU. The use of reverse Stackelberg game improves the interaction between PUs and ESUs, so it acts as a bridge between coordination model considered in [4] and conventional CRN models [8]. This method changes in the process to authenticate ESU and selection criteria for ESU at the PS.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing cognitive radio networks during cooperative spectrum access using game theory

Kumar

Trivedi

2014

2014 9th International Conference on Industrial and Information Systems (ICIIS)

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Cognitive radio has become one of the most promising technology and probable solution for the shortage of spectrum. This paper deals with a different class of security problem, where multiple half-duplex secondary users independently eavesdrop the communication of primary users, unless given access to communicate over the same spectrum band. Primary Station (PS) needs to characterize the optimal rule to grant spectrum access to selected secondary users. Granting spectrum access to selected Eavesdropping Secondary User (ESU) helps in improving the rate of uneavesdropped messages to the PS, i.e., primary secure rate, as transmission from secondary user interferes with the eavesdropping signal from other ESUs. The proposed method uses reverse Stackelberg game theory for the selection of an ESU by the PS to increase the utility when multiple ESUs exist. This method emphasizes on the utility as well as security of the PS. Channel gains provided by the ESUs are authenticated. PS can grant access to any authentic ESU even if its the strongest eavesdropper. The main criteria for selection of ESU is based on the utility and net secure rate of primary user (PU). Results show improved utility and net secure rate of the PU.

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Multiple access game with a cognitive jammer

Cited by 11 publications

References 9 publications

User-Centric View of Jamming Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

User-Centric View of Jamming Games in Cognitive Radio Networks

Prospect theoretic analysis of anti-jamming communications in cognitive radio networks

Securing cognitive radio networks during cooperative spectrum access using game theory

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