Multimedia Service Discrimination Based on Fair Resource Allocation Using Bargaining Solutions

Abstract

We deal with a resource allocation problem for multimedia service discrimination in wireless networks. We assume that a service provider allocates network resources to users who can choose and access one of the discriminated services. To express the rational service selection of users, the utility function of users is devised to reflect both service quality and cost. Regarding the utility function of a service provider, total profit and efficiency of resource usage have been considered. The proposed service discrimination framework is composed of two game models. An outer model is a repeated Stackelberg game between a service provider and a user group, while an inner model is a service selection game among users, which is solved by adopting the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. Through simulation experiments, we compare the proposed framework with existing resource allocation methods according to user cost sensitivity. The proposed framework performed better than existing frameworks in terms of total profit and fairness.

User-Centric Energy-Efficient Multimedia Multicast/Broadcast Solutions: A Survey

“…Optimal pricing for SVC multicasting to heterogeneous users are investigated in [111]. Additionally, [112] has studied wireless resource allocation for multimedia service discrimination based on bargaining solutions. The additional aspects of interest are: adaptive SVC rate encoding, UE energy saving, and users' energy or price sensitivity for revenue maximization.…”