Multilevel regulatory coordination: The interplay between European Union, federal and regional regulatory agencies

Abstract

We know that European regulatory networks tend to broaden the gap between regulators and executives in the member states. But what is their impact on inter-agencies relationship at the national level? The scope of issues addressed by European regulatory networks may cover the competences of several independent regulatory agencies in the domestic arena. Who is competent to participate in the European regulatory network? What happens with the independent regulatory agency that cannot participate? This can trigger confusion, competence conflicts, but can also be an opportunity to develop coordination among the concerned independent regulatory agency. This situation is particularly delicate in federal states when the concerned independent regulatory agencies are located on different governmental levels. Against the background of interdependent regulatory competences across levels, this article examines the conditions for the rise of inter-independent regulatory agencies coordination regarding their participation in European regulatory networks. Theoretically, we engage with the literature on coordination between federal and subnational governmental actors for European Union affairs and extend its application to regulatory actors. Based on a longitudinal case study on energy regulation in Belgium, we bring three key findings. First, the federal regulator’s acceptance to coordinate is explained by the rising interdependencies between regulators across levels. Second, the regional regulator’s move from a contentious strategy to a more cooperative one is explained by learning. Third, bilateral coordination arrangements may pre-empt the emergence of multilateral ones.

Conflicting national policies: The creation of the euro and the rebalancing of telecommunications prices

“…Other papers have examined the coordination problems and the agreements that emerge among the constellation of agencies participating in the regulatory process (Jordana & Sancho D, 2004;Mathieu et al, 2017;González & Verhoest, 2020;Mathieu et al, 2021). Our paper contributes to this literature, as we examine the interaction between the government departments and the regulators participating in the establishment of fixed telephony prices.…”

Policy Convergence under Decentralization: Lessons from Indonesia’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

“…It has been argued that policy convergence prevails when there is national and regional party congruence. Such congruence ensures partisan links concerning ideas and loyalties, which foster policy convergence (Mathieu et al 2020;Dobbins et al 2018;Keating 201). In contrast, in certain circumstances, subnational parties may pursue distinct interests to achieve responsiveness; these interests can vary across regions and differ from the national partisan position (Stecker 2015).…”

Introduction to the Handbook of Regulatory Authorities

“…The number of regulatory agencies started to grow considerably in other regions with a small delay, especially in Latin America since the mid-1990s (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005) and in South and East Asia from the early 2000s (Dubash and Morgan 2012;Ohnesorge 2016). It is also worth noting that, especially after the 2000s, regulatory agencies are also mushrooming at the supranational level, namely in the European Union, where they configure multilevel regulatory regimes (Mathieu et al 2020). As a result, agencification can be seen as a global macro-trend towards the increasing institutionalization of regulatory governance, which is however displaying considerable cross-country and cross-sectoral variation (Braithwaite 2008;Levi-Faur 2011b).…”