Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game of Rumor-Affected Enterprises under Demand Disruption

Abstract

Rumors regarding food, medicine, epidemic diseases, and public emergencies greatly impact consumers’ purchase intention, disrupt market demand, affect enterprises’ operating strategies, and eventually increase the risk of market chaos. Governments must play an active role with limited resources under the situation of rumor spreading and demand disruption to maintain stable and sustainable market development. To identify the optimal evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of both small and large enterprises when facing rumors, this paper investigates the following two choices of enterprises: reasonable and unreasonable pricing. The results reveal that government supervision priority should be set based on the rumor severity, collusion in markup and the endogeneity of the enterprises. From an exogenous perspective, rumor spreading induces enterprises to overcharge, and government supervision has the opposite effect. However, the demand disruption ratio is proven to motivate enterprises to implement reasonable pricing. The profit and loss ratio and homoplasy are two endogenous factors affecting enterprise decisions. Small enterprises are more likely to take advantage of public panic and overcharge, while large enterprises are inclined to choose reasonable pricing in consideration of their corporate image. In addition, the evidence indicates that the ESS of large firms has a stronger impact on small firms.

A study on the competitive dissemination of disinformation and knowledge on social media

“…In this section, the evolution track of different initial points to the equilibrium point of the players is discussed. The initial values of the parameters are set as =0.6, C1=0.3 and C2=0.3, and the initial values are set as (0.1,0.6), (0.3,0.5), (0.5,0.1), (0.4,0.9) and (0.6,0.5) (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b).…”

“…Third, this paper focuses on social media users, which is different from previous studies that focus on the game between the public and other subjects, such as the public and the government (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b), the public and social platforms (Yang et al.…”

“…, 2018), which brings positive influence (Xia et al. , 2015) and plays a critical role in behavior decisions of disinformation makers (Zhao et al. , 2021a, b).…”

Mathematical Problems in Engineering Pharmaceutical Cold Chain Transportation Decision Making under the Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism: A Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

“…When facing a public health emergency, adopting a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can better mobilize the enthusiasm of community residents [35]. In the same situation, by managing the spread of rumors and the end of demand, the government can maintain market stability and sustainable development by identifying the optimal ESS for SMEs [36].…”

An Ensemble Learning Based Approach for Detecting and Tracking COVID19 Rumors

“…Rumors can cause various effects on economic, political and other aspects of the global society and their transmission has an increasing substantial impact on human lives and social stability [4,5]. During these situations, governments must play an important role in order to maintain sustainable market development [6][7][8]. For instance, during COVID-19, people in many countries felt scared once the World Health Organization declared it a pandemic and therefore many rumors spread on social media about specific drugs which can prevent the disease or reduce the infection, causing high demand for these drugs which affected the sustainability of the entire healthcare market [8].…”