Multi-player Game Model and Mixed Strategy Analysis in Sharing System

Yu, Ming-yuan; Li, Qian; Wu, Zhou

doi:10.1109/ispce-cn48734.2019.8958629

Cited by 1 publication

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…At present, bike-sharing-related research focuses on five aspects: economic value analysis [1], environmental benefit analysis [28,29], industry impact factor analysis [30][31][32][33][34][35], market mechanism analysis [12,[36][37][38][39], and industry management [13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]40], which provide a theoretical basis for further research on the bike-sharing industry from multiple levels, but still lack a systematic and dynamic research approach.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned above, the existing studies only consider single-individual competition [13,14] or competition with a few individuals [15][16][17][18][19][20][21] in the bike-sharing industry and cannot provide effective guidance on the promotion of the EPR system (i.e., they cannot predict the trajectory of the strategy evolution between local governments and bike-sharing companies in the game process). Behavioral psychology shows that decision makers have short-sighted behavior, for which individuals are heterogeneous and parties tend to have limited rationality [25].…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The study takes a systemic perspective and considers the satisfaction of residents under two policies: ET and EPR. In this paper, local governments and bike-sharing companies are considered as two large groups participating in the game, rather than the single-individual competition [12][13][14] or few individuals in the traditional game [15][16][17][18][19][20][21]. In contrast to traditional game theory, which is modified instantly based on the optimal response function [17][18][19][20][21], evolutionary game theory offers a more comprehensive and precise approach to studying problems.…”

Section: Introduction 1backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, local governments and bike-sharing companies are considered as two large groups participating in the game, rather than the single-individual competition [12][13][14] or few individuals in the traditional game [15][16][17][18][19][20][21]. In contrast to traditional game theory, which is modified instantly based on the optimal response function [17][18][19][20][21], evolutionary game theory offers a more comprehensive and precise approach to studying problems. This is because evolutionary game theory not only accounts for the players' rationality, but also considers their decision reaction time.…”

Section: Introduction 1backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abandoned-Bike-Sharing Recycling: Impact of Recycling Subsidy Policy

Liu

Yang

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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The launch of large-scale bike sharing in China has effectively met the demand for low-carbon short-distance travel, but it has also led to the emergence of a large number of abandoned bikes, which is called the “bike-sharing siege”. In order to achieve the sustainable development of the bike-sharing industry, this paper discusses how to encourage bike-sharing companies to recycle and reuse abandoned bikes and improve the efficiency of local government financial resources based on the promotion of the EPR system. We apply the evolutionary game to investigate the interaction mechanism of complex behaviors between local governments and bike-sharing companies under two subsidy policies: a fixed recycling subsidy and regressive recycling subsidy. The results show that both recycling subsidy policies have diminishing marginal effects. In addition to incentives, local governments need to unify bike-sharing parking, establish bike-sharing monitoring platforms, and reasonably allocate bike parking spaces to ensure the quality of the urban environment. Under effective regulation, by implementing a regressive recycling subsidy policy and setting a rational amount for the recycling subsidy, local governments can effectively promote the EPR system, strengthen the environmental responsibility of companies, and avoid the “free-rider phenomenon”. Based on the current situation in China, this research provides references for each local government to formulate management policies from the perspective of subsidy policy.

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