Multi-party game and simulation in the withdrawal of rural homestead: evidence from China

Song, Lei; Lyu, Ping; Cao, Yingui

doi:10.1108/caer-05-2020-0084

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Moreover, the labor transfer reduces the family agricultural labor force and the resident population in rural areas. However, it is still controversial how it affects farmers' willingness to withdraw from land [36]. One view holds that, with urbanization and the vigorous development of secondary and tertiary industries, the income gap between agriculture and non-agricultural industries drives rural labor to leave the land and transfer to nonagricultural sectors [37].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Labor Transfer Improve Farmers’ Willingness to Withdraw from Farming?—A Bivariate Probit Modeling Approach

Ding

et al. 2023

Land

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Because of the increased expansion of the non-agricultural industry spurred on by vigorous urbanization, labor migration or transfer from farm to urban regions is to become more predominant in China. Studying the effect of labor transfer on farmers’ willingness to withdraw from land is conducive to deepening the understanding of the reality of the “separation of human and farmland”. As most rural livelihoods, directly and indirectly, depend upon farming, the socio-economic impact of leaving the homestead fosters profound research value. Moreover, it would provide a decision-making reference for the government to improve the design of the rural land withdrawal system and related support policies. This article uses the survey data of 953 farmers in Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Anhui, China, to empirically analyze labor transfer’s effect on farmers’ willingness to withdraw from farmland. We construct a bivariate Probit model by eliminating the endogenous issue to craft its findings. This study outlines its findings: (i) 61.805% of the farmers were unwilling, and 18.048% were willing to withdraw from the contracted land and homestead. While 12.067% of the farmers were only willing to withdraw from the contracted land, 8.080% of the farmers were only willing to withdraw from the homestead. Further testing found a positive correlation between farmers’ willingness to withdraw from contracted land and the homestead. (ii) The overall labor transfer of households can increase the willingness of farmers to quit contracted land and homestead farming. The incomplete labor transfer of households can improve the willingness of farmers to quit contracted land. Still, it has no significant impact on the willingness of farmers to quit their homesteads. The family’s complete labor transfer incentivizes farmers’ willingness to withdraw from contracted land and the homestead, which is more potent than incomplete family labor transfer. (iii) Incomplete labor transfer of female households has an incentive effect on farmers’ willingness to quit contracted land, and the effect is more robust than that of incomplete household labor transfer. Seemingly, complete female labor transfer of households has an incentive effect on farmers’ willingness to quit contracted land and the homestead, and the effect is stronger than the complete labor transfer of the family. Because of this, the government should respect the wishes of farmers and strengthen the effective connection and mutual promotion between the homestead and contracted land withdrawal policy. Moreover, pay concentrated attention to the vital role of different types of labor transfer, and targeted labor transfer mechanisms should be used to guide farmers in an orderly manner.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Labor Transfer Improve Farmers’ Willingness to Withdraw from Farming?—A Bivariate Probit Modeling Approach

Ding

et al. 2023

Land

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“…In sharp contrast, the current situation of judicial governance of land value-added benefit distribution has been rarely studied and discussed by scholars [39]. The relevant system to standardize the distribution of value-added benefits from homesteads is still in the exploratory stage, and the promotion and success or failure of the reform of the homestead system are closely related to the game of interests and distribution [40]. Currently, the value-added benefit of homesteads has gradually become clear, and the issue of distribution fairness and justice has become the last hurdle restricting the development of homesteads.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Realization Mechanism of Land Value-Added Benefit Distribution Justice in Rural Homestead Disputes in China—Based on the Perspective of Judicial Governance

Dong

2023

Land

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In the process of urban-rural Integration, the reform of the “separation of three rights” of homesteads has released huge institutional dividends for the vigorous utilization of rural homesteads. With the gradual deepening of the reform of the homestead system the number of disputes related to the transfer of the land use of rural homesteads is increasing rapidly. Based on the quasi-case research method, this paper integrates the relevant case facts, the focus of the dispute, the legal basis, and other case elements and realizes the judgment of case similarity based on the legal argument model, which aims to solve the problem of realizing justice in the distribution of land value-added benefit in homestead disputes. It also puts forward the realization mechanism reform suggestions based on the perspective of judicial governance, so as to demonstrate the ways in which conflicts arise and are resolved in the distribution of value-added benefit in China’s rural homestead transfer system. By using the search tool of the “China Judgment Document Network” to screen a total of 305 valid samples, it was revealed that the core problem of China’s homestead governance is the unfair distribution of land value-added benefit; that is, it is difficult to achieve effective distribution of land value-added benefit among farmers, collectives, and governments. The core litigation points in rural homestead disputes include homestead policies and the application of law, the litigability of cases, the scope of the subject, and the realization of powers, as well as the quantitative basis and rule scheme. From the perspective of judicial governance, the deep-seated issues in the distribution of value-added benefits reflected in the points of dispute are examined as follows: (1) the subject of the dispute faces judicial avoidance; (2) There is a game relationship in the value of subject rights; (3) it is difficult to quantitatively adjudicate under the existing allocation rules; (4) Institutional difficulties such as insufficient eligibility of applicable policies. Based on the conclusions of the above problems, this study proposes a judicial governance path for the realization of homestead value-added benefit distribution justice: the governance model is reorganized and optimized based on the purpose of realizing distributive justice; the value of rights throughout the process is integrated based on initial acquisition and redistribution; a multi-center linkage governance mechanism is constructed based on the coordination of homestead value-added benefit through all stages, which is supposed to provide an important reference for the judicial governance path for developing countries with similar difficulties, including China, to achieve justice in the distribution of land value-added benefit.

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“…These factors encompass household income, population size, social security, homestead area, compensation standards, and access to social public services [ 25 , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] ]. Furthermore, although scholars have not yet systematically summarized the different patterns of homestead withdrawal, they have conducted preliminary research exploring the applicability, feasibility, risk levels, and classification methods of these various patterns ([ 31 ]; Wang and tan, 2020 [ 32 ]). While some scholars have initiated preliminary research on the relationship between homestead withdrawal patterns and peasant households' welfare demands, this research is still in the theoretical stage.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bilateral matching decision-making for rural homesteads withdrawal patterns and types of peasant households’ welfare needs: Evidence from China in the context of land spatial planning regulation

Zhu,

Wang,

Niu

et al. 2024

Heliyon

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Multi-party game and simulation in the withdrawal of rural homestead: evidence from China

Cited by 14 publications

References 40 publications

Does Labor Transfer Improve Farmers’ Willingness to Withdraw from Farming?—A Bivariate Probit Modeling Approach

Does Labor Transfer Improve Farmers’ Willingness to Withdraw from Farming?—A Bivariate Probit Modeling Approach

Research on Realization Mechanism of Land Value-Added Benefit Distribution Justice in Rural Homestead Disputes in China—Based on the Perspective of Judicial Governance

Bilateral matching decision-making for rural homesteads withdrawal patterns and types of peasant households’ welfare needs: Evidence from China in the context of land spatial planning regulation

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