Multi‐Market Competition, R&amp;D, and Welfare in Oligopoly

Kawasaki, Akio; Lin, Ming Hsin; Matsushima, Noriaki

doi:10.4284/0038-4038-2012.190

Cited by 14 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…This places him at a strategic disadvantage relative to the other local market competitors who, then, reoptimize. 7 Our paper has also a similarity with that of Kawasaki et al (2014) who considered a multimarket Cournot model where firms are engaged in research and development (R&D) investments. A multimarket firm operates on all the markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game

Agbo

Rousselière

Salanié

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We build a theoretical model to study a market structure of a marketing cooperative with direct selling, in which many farmers are members of an agricultural marketing cooperative. They can sell their production either to the cooperative or on an oligopolistic local market. We show that the decision to sell to the cooperative induces an anti-competitive effect on the direct selling market. The cooperative facilitates collusion on the local market by making farmers softer competitors on that market. Conversely, direct selling may create a "healthy emulation" among farmers, leading to more production benefiting the cooperative.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game

Agbo

Rousselière

Salanié

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The authors show that insufficient entry occurs when certain conditions are present because the entry of a downstream firm has a positive effect. Kawasaki, Lin, and Matsushima (2014) investigate a multi-market Cournot model with R&D investments in which a multi-market firm encounters new competitors entering one of the markets. They show that, depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can occur.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal number of privatised products in a differentiated mixed oligopoly with free market entry

Kawasaki

2020

Australian Economic Papers

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This study investigates how a privatisation policy affects long-run market equilibrium when a public firm produces multiple products. It contributes to the literature by (a) examining the long-run effect of a privatisation policy on a multi-product public firm and (b) investigating whether the market is characterised by excess or insufficient entry when in long-run equilibrium. This study assumes that there is a multi-product public firm and potential private firm entrants that produce one product in the economy. The public firm can privatise some production sectors, the privatised firm produces only one product, and the potential entrant private firm can enter the market by incurring entry costs. The public firm decides how many sectors to privatise. The private firms enter the market if they earn non-negative profits. The study's findings show that full nationalisation is socially preferable in the long run. In equilibrium, when the number of production sectors of the public firm is small, excess entry occurs easily; the converse is also true. The results may assist the government in determining its privatisation policy and the private sector in determining whether to enter markets that were previously monopolised by the government.

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“…Kawasaki et al . () also discuss similar impacts of the existence of the monopolistic market on the competitive market by considering an asymmetric multi‐market competition with R&D. However, they do not address a mixed oligopoly.…”

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confidence: 99%

Partial Privatization Under Asymmetric Multi‐market Competition

Kawasaki

Naito

2019

Rev Urban & Reg Develop

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Under the assumption that a public firm provides goods or services to two markets and that a private firm provides goods or services to one market only, this study examines whether public firms should be privatized. It also investigates how the production quantity of a private firm changes when its degree of privatization increases. We find that when the market share of a duopoly market is large (small), partial privatization (nationalization) is socially preferable. We also find that the quantity produced by the private firm does not always increase along with the degree of privatization.

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Multi‐Market Competition, R&D, and Welfare in Oligopoly

Cited by 14 publications

References 38 publications

Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game

Agricultural marketing cooperatives with direct selling: A cooperative–non-cooperative game

Optimal number of privatised products in a differentiated mixed oligopoly with free market entry

Partial Privatization Under Asymmetric Multi‐market Competition

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