Multi-level evolution in population games

Canals, José; Vega‐Redondo, Fernando

doi:10.1007/s001820050055

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…When we consider cultural evolution, some group selection models do not seem so implausible. [See Sober and Wilson (1998), Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002), Bergstrom (2002), Canals and Vega Redondo (1998), etc] If however, group selection is taken in the most general sense and kin selection is taken in the most general sense, then -as Price (1972) showed, these are mathematically equivalent. [Frank (1995a[Frank ( ) (1998, Gardner and West (2004)] In nature, local interaction is sometimes mingled with kin selection, when individuals live near their kin but, as Hamilton already noted, local interaction in itself can create conditions more favorable for cooperation.…”

Section: Behavior In Accord With Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of Moral Norms

Harms

Skyrms

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology

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Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don't. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily concerned with describing the many forms that moral norms take in various cultures, with the emerging implication that moral norms are mere arbitrary products of culture. Philosophers, on the other hand, have been more concerned with trying to understand the nature and source of rules that all cultures ought to follow, with relatively little regard for what people actually do. The tension between the two approaches has to do with whether there are any standards higher than the whims of culture in determining right and wrong. Typically, the social sciences say "no", pointing at the diversity of moral beliefs. Most philosophers (along with people of moral conviction) feel that there must be some deeper source of morality than the trends and fads of culture. Unfortunately, the nature and source of such standards has remained something of a mystery. Recent work on the evolution of norms has changed this picture dramatically. Evolutionary explanation of the emergence of moral norms proceeds in stages, as the evolutionary process itself proceeds in stages, rather than arriving all-at-once at a finished product. First, one must give an account of how behavior in consonance with the norms can arise. This may be no small matter, since some norms prescribe behavior that appears, on the face of it, to reduce Darwinian fitness. The explanations may be different for different classes of norms. Then, once the evolution of the behavior has been explained, the question remains as to the evolution of its normative status. Part of what makes a kind of behavior a norm consists in society's reaction to those who do not follow the norm. Enforcement marks a norm. Violation of a norm elicits various kinds of enforcement behavior-disapproval, punishment, ostracism-often at some costs to the enforcers. The evolution of these higher-order patterns of behavior must also be explained. Finally, one might hope in the end to also have an account of the evolution of the language of moral judgment, together with an evolutionary account of its meaning. That is asking for quite a lot, but an evolutionary account of the emergence of moral protolanguage, or of moral signals, would be a beginning.

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Section: Behavior In Accord With Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of Moral Norms

Harms

Skyrms

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology

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“…If nA$+nxÄ A"<0, it can be shown that there exists a set [a, b] n in which all equilibrium action profiles must lie and which has the following property: restricting the action set of this game to [a, b] yields an aggregative game which satisfies (4 8). 8 As a special case to be considered below, we say that a game 1 # A is separable if H 12 =0. In this case material payoffs may be expressed as the sum of two separate functions of x i and nxÄ respectively.…”

Section: Aggregative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although we do not explore the effects of group selection formally in the present paper, it is easy to construct models of intergroup competition in which the efficiency-enhancing effects of reciprocal preferences (arising from their altruism when they are sufficiently widespread) cause such preferences to outcompete purely self-regarding preferences. Group selection in general tends to favor the survival of efficiency-enhancing traits (see, for instance, Canals and Vega-Redondo [8], and the references cited therein. )…”

Section: Efficiency and Assortative Interactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From Lemma 1, equilibria of 1(n) and 1(0) are symmetric under the stated conditions. Hence there exist c, d # [a, b] such that x m =(c, ..., c) and (8), c # (a, b). We claim that d # [a, b).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To see why, note that for x=(b, ..., b) to be an equilibrium of 1(0), we must have u i Â x i 0 for all i # I. But at x=(b, ..., b), (8) implies that T(b, nb)<0 and from (5) we therefore have…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

Sethi¹,

Somanathan²

2001

Journal of Economic Theory

189

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Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations

Powers

Taylor

Bryson

2012

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Pro-social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defectors, is often suggested as a mechanism that maintains cooperation in large human groups. Importantly, models that support this idea have to date only allowed defectors to be the target of punishment. However, recent empirical work has demonstrated the existence of anti-social punishment in public goods games. That is, individuals that defect have been found to also punish cooperators. Some recent theoretical studies have found that such antisocial punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation. However, the evolution of anti-social punishment in group-structured populations has not been formally addressed. Previous work has informally argued that group-structure must favour pro-social punishment. Here we formally investigate how two demographic factors, group size and dispersal frequency, affect selection pressures on pro-and antisocial punishment. Contrary to the suggestions of previous work, we find that antisocial punishment can prevent the evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation under a range of group structures. Given that anti-social punishment has now been found in all studied extant human cultures, the claims of previous models showing the co-evolution of pro-social punishment and cooperation in group-structured populations should be re-evaluated. [This is a post-print of an accepted manuscript published in

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Multi-level evolution in population games

Cited by 5 publications

References 15 publications

Evolution of Moral Norms

Evolution of Moral Norms

Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations

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