Multi-Fleet Platoon Matching: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Johansson, Alexander; Nekouei, Ehsan; Johansson, Karl Henrik; Mårtensson, Jonas

doi:10.1109/itsc.2018.8569379

Cited by 30 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Platoon coordination when each truck optimizes its own profit was considered in [21] and in our previous research efforts [22]- [25]. The motivation lies in the fact that trucks can be owned by small transport companies or even single persons, making centralized coordination hard to implement.…”

Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The motivation lies in the fact that trucks can be owned by small transport companies or even single persons, making centralized coordination hard to implement. The works in [21], [22], [24], [25] use non-cooperative games to model and study strategic interactions among trucks when they form platoons to maximize their individual profits. The work in [23] uses a cooperative game to design a profit redistribution mechanism to incentivize trucks on the same road segment to form and maintain the optimal platoon formation.…”

Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Real-Time Cross-Fleet Pareto-Improving Truck Platoon Coordination

Johansson,

Mårtensson,

Sun

et al. 2022

Preprint

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This paper studies a multi-fleet platoon coordination system in transport networks that deploy hubs to form trucks into platoons. The trucks belong to different fleets that are interested in increasing their profits by platooning across fleets. The profit of each fleet incorporates platooning rewards and costs for waiting at hubs. Each truck has a fixed route and a waiting time budget to spend at the hubs along its route. To ensure that all fleets are willing to participate in the system, we develop a cross-fleet Pareto-improving coordination strategy that guarantees higher fleet profits than a coordination strategy without cross-fleet platoons. By leveraging multiple hubs for platoon formation, the coordination strategy can be implemented in a real-time and distributed fashion while largely reducing the amount of travel information to be shared for system-wide coordination. We evaluate the proposed strategy in a simulation study over the Swedish transportation network. The cross-fleet platooning strategy significantly improves fleets' profits compared with single-fleet platooning, especially the profits from smaller fleets. The cross-fleet platooning strategy also shows strong competitiveness in terms of the system-wide profit compared to the case when a system planner optimizes all fleets' total profit.

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Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Work On Platoon Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real-Time Cross-Fleet Pareto-Improving Truck Platoon Coordination

Johansson,

Mårtensson,

Sun

et al. 2022

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Solutions to the platoon matching problem where vehicles individually seek to maximize their profits from platooning have been proposed in [14] and [15]. In these solutions, each vehicle seeks to minimize its traveling cost by deciding on its departure time from a common origin.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The scenario is modeled as a non-cooperative game and Nash equilibrium is used as the solution concept. We study a similar scenario as in [14] and [15], but our focus is to propose different distribution models of the profit and study how they affect the total profit and the platoon rate.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Models for Profit-Sharing in Multi-fleet Platoons

Johansson,

Mårtensson

2022

Preprint

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Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same origin and are operated by competing transportation companies. The vehicles have default departure times, but can decide to depart at other times in order to benefit from platooning. We model the strategic interaction among vehicles with game theory and consider pure Nash equilibria as the solution concept. In a numerical evaluation we compare the outcomes of the games associated with different distribution models of the profit.

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“…1 + ≤ + 1 ∀ ∈ , ∈ , ∈ Where constraints (20) and (21) are linearized forms of (9), constraint (10) is linearized by (22), constraints (23)-(25) are linearized forms of (11), constraint (12) is linearized by (26) and (27), constraint (13) is linearized by (28)-(32), and finally constraint (33) is the linearized version of constraint (17).…”

Section: Model Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Platform-based Platooning to Connect Two Autonomous Vehicle Areas

Pourmohammad-Zia

Schulte

Negenborn

2020

2020 IEEE 23rd International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC)

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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have been successfully applied in closed environments such as ports and industrial zones, while their operation in open areas has a long way to go. The current research is initiated to overcome this limitation by the introduction of platooning as a transfer mode. It investigates a container transportation problem between a port and an industrial area where the platform facilitates collaborative transportation. Both zones are appropriate for automated driving, whereas their connecting route is not. Different carriers are present at the port, and each transportation task can be done either by a truck or an AV. The platform not only operates as the interface between demand points and carriers but also provides a platooning service to move AVs through non-autonomous roads. It specifies the transportation schedules and service fees based on which the carriers will decide whether to use AVs or trucks for each transportation task. This is modeled as a Stackelberg competition, transformed into a conventional mixedinteger model, and solved to optimality. The approach enables demand and resource pooling between the port and industrial area. Numerical results show that the successful application of AVs highly depends on platoon formation costs and regulations.

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Multi-Fleet Platoon Matching: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Cited by 30 publications

References 12 publications

Real-Time Cross-Fleet Pareto-Improving Truck Platoon Coordination

Real-Time Cross-Fleet Pareto-Improving Truck Platoon Coordination

Game Theoretic Models for Profit-Sharing in Multi-fleet Platoons

Platform-based Platooning to Connect Two Autonomous Vehicle Areas

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