Multi-dimensional price discrimination

Liu, Qihong; Shuai, Jie

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.07.007

Cited by 25 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Brekke and Straume (2004), and Liang and Mai (2006)], and multi-dimensional product characteristics [e.g. Irmen and Thisse (1998), and Liu and Shuai (2013)]. 2 Moreover, third-degree price discrimination has been studied in spatial competition models in various ways.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

Feng

2018

Scottish J Political Eco

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This paper studies how firms choose their product differentiation levels when they engage in third‐degree price discrimination in the following product market competition in a location‐price model. We show that firms will not choose to locate at the two endpoints if different consumer groups have similar sizes. Hence, the principle of maximum differentiation does not hold, resulting in a more intense product market price competition. Only if the size of one group of consumers is sufficiently larger than that of the other group, would firms make their products as differentiated as possible by choosing the two endpoints as their locations.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

Feng

2018

Scottish J Political Eco

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“…In that case, the two-period model reduces to two replications of the static equilibrium which has been analyzed in several existing studies (e.g. Liu and Shuai, 2013;Tabuchi, 1994). Based on these models it is straightforward to prove that …rm i's equilibrium prices and pro…ts (marked with superscript u; for uniform pricing) in each period are:…”

Section: The Marginal Consumers Line (Mcl)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the assumption of strong dominance, they show that …rms want to maximize di¤erentiation on the dominant dimension but minimize di¤erentiation on all other dimensions. Liu and Shuai (2013) employs a similar model of 2-group price discrimination. Their model is one-period, and …rms price discriminate based on exogenous information about consumers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in a Multi-Dimensional Preferences Market

2016

Self Cite

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" "B Be e h ha av vi io or r-B Ba as s e e d d P Pr ri ic ce e D Di is s c cr ri im mi in na at ti io on n i in n a a M M u ul lt ti i-D Di im me e n ns s i io on na al l P Pr re e f fe e r re e n nc ce e s s M M a ar rk ke e t t" " R Ro os s a a-B Br ra an nc ca a E Es s t t e ev ve es s Q Q i ih ho on ng g L Li iu u J J i ie e S Sh hu ua ai i NIPE WP 04/ 2016 " "B Be eh ha av vi io or r-B Ba as se ed d P Pr ri ic ce e D Di is sc cr ri im mi in na at ti io on n i in n a a M Mu ul lt ti i-D Di im me en ns si io on na al l P Pr re ef fe er re en nc ce es s M Ma ar rk ke et t" " R Ro os sa a-B Br ra an nc ca a E Es st te ev ve es s Q Qi ih ho on ng g L Li iu u J Ji ie e S Sh hu ua ai i N NI IP PE E *

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“…In Shin and Sudhir () where a two‐period Hotelling model is employed, pricing based on customers' past purchase behavior can be profitable when either heterogeneity in purchase quantities or preference stochasticity is sufficiently high. Liu and Shuai () develop a multidimensional Hotelling model to examine the profitability of discriminatory pricing. The authors find that when firms price discriminate on one and the same dimension, they make more profits than under uniform pricing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior‐Based Price Discrimination with Experience Goods

Chung

2015

The Manchester School

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This paper examines the profitability of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) by duopolists producing horizontally differentiated experience goods. Considering a three-stage game in which the firms first make price discrimination decisions followed by two-stage pricing decisions, the two main results we obtain are the following: (i) if consumers underestimate the quality of the products at a level that is not very low, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria where both firms do not collect information about consumers' purchase histories so that neither firm price discriminates and where both firms collect consumer information to practice BBPD; (ii) BBPD is more profitable than uniform pricing if consumers overestimate at a more than moderate level.

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Multi-dimensional price discrimination

Cited by 25 publications

References 22 publications

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

Location choices and third‐degree spatial price discrimination

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in a Multi-Dimensional Preferences Market

Behavior‐Based Price Discrimination with Experience Goods

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