Multi-attribute online reverse auctions: Recent research trends

Pham, Long; Teich, Jeffrey E.; Wallenius, Hannele; Wallenius, Jyrki

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.08.043

Cited by 74 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 71 publications

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“…It is expected that efficient multi-attribute schemes like auctions will turn to dominate the long-term and stable 12B e-markets (e.g., see Milgrom 2000, Parkes andKalagnanam 2005). For recent reviews of multi-attribute auctions, see Sandholm (2013) and Pham et al (2015). However, our perspective is quite different from the single-unit procurement studied in the above papers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

Huang

2017

Production and Operations Management

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This study is the first proposing allocatively efficient multi‐attribute auctions for the procurement of multiple items. In the B2B e‐commerce logistics problem (ELP), the e‐commerce platform is the shipper generating a large number of online orders between product sellers and buyers, and third‐party logistics (3PL) providers are carriers that can deliver these online orders. This study focuses on the ELP with multiple attributes (ELP‐MA), which is generally the problem of matching the shipper's online orders and 3PL providers given that price and other attributes are jointly evaluated. We develop a one‐sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (O‐VCG) auction for the ELP‐MA. The O‐VCG auction leads to incentive compatibility (on the sell side), allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. We next introduce the concept of universally unsatisfied set to construct a primal‐dual algorithm, also called the primal‐dual Vickrey (PDV) auction. We prove that the O‐VCG auction can be viewed as a single‐attribute multi‐unit forward Vickrey (SA‐MFV) auction. Both PDV and SA‐MFV auctions realize VCG payments and truthful bidding for general valuations. This result reveals the underlying link not only between single‐attribute and multi‐attribute auctions, but between static and dynamic auctions in a multi‐attribute setting.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

Huang

2017

Production and Operations Management

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“…As a result of this fact, the number of studies that deal with the datasets from the private sector is scarce in the literature. The need to develop theories and practices concerning the adoption, implementation, and utilization of e-auctions in the private sector has also been highlighted in several studies (Standing et al 2010, Schoenherr et al 2012, Pham et al 2015. Bapna et al (2003) provide both analytical and empirical evidence regarding the importance of bid increment and lot size in the revenue generation.…”

Section: E-auction Studies With the Private Sector Datasetsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of the main drivers affecting the buyer surplus in E-auctions

Karabağ

Tan

2018

International Journal of Production Research

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We empirically examine the impacts of the product category, the auction format, the 2008 global financial crisis, the group purchasing, the contract type, the platform ownership, and the number of participating suppliers on the buyer surplus obtained from e-auctions. To this end, we collect a unique dataset from a purchasing organization that offers e-auction solutions to its corporate customers. By using a standard Tobit model, we show that the product categories, the auction type, and the number of participating suppliers have significant effects on the decrease in the procurement prices with respect to the minimum of the initial submitted bids. It is observed that the 2008 global financial crisis led to an increase in the buyer surplus. We classify the product categories into three groups based on their impacts on the average of the decrease in the procurement prices. We show that the average decrease in procurement prices is higher for the group purchasing option than for the individual buying option. It is concluded that the types of contract between buyers and auctioneer and the platform ownership have no statistically significant effects on the average decrease in procurement prices.

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“…Since then several other incentive models based on reverse auctions have been proposed [3,13,14]. At the same time, auction theory for electronic commerce continues to advance and multi-attributive auctions have gradually become a research hot spot, incorporating qualitative attributes to decide the winner [15]. This was shown to have many advantages for the MCS case, too [8].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Respecting Auctions as Incentive Mechanisms in Mobile Crowd Sensing

Dimitriou

Krontiris

2015

Information Security Theory and Practice

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In many mobile crowdsensing scenarios it is desirable to give micro-payments to contributors as an incentive for their participation. However, to further encourage participants to use the system, one important requirement is protection of user privacy. In this work we present a reverse auction mechanism as an efficient way to offer incentives to users by allowing them to determine their own price for the data they provide, but also as a way to motivate them to submit better quality data. At the same time our auction protocol guarantees bidders' anonymity and suggests a new rewarding mechanism that enables winners to claim their reward without being linked to the data they contributed. Our protocol is scalable, can be applied to a large class of auctions and remains both computation-and communication-efficient so that it can be run to the mobile devices of users.

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Multi-attribute online reverse auctions: Recent research trends

Cited by 74 publications

References 71 publications

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

An empirical analysis of the main drivers affecting the buyer surplus in E-auctions

Privacy-Respecting Auctions as Incentive Mechanisms in Mobile Crowd Sensing

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