Multi‐actor Initiatives after Rana Plaza: Factory Managers’ Views

Abstract

The Rana Plaza factory disaster in April 2013, which resulted in the death of a large number of factory workers and injured many more in Bangladesh's ready‐made garment industry, highlighted the sustained failure of the government of Bangladesh to address safety in the workplace. In the wake of the tragedy two significant transnational governance initiatives emerged — the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (hereafter the Accord) and the Alliance for Bangladesh Workers’ Safety (hereafter the Alliance). For the first time, different key stakeholders worked together to address fire, electrical and structural safety of factory buildings. This study analyses the perceptions of factory managers in Bangladesh regarding the Accord and Alliance agreements. The article argues that although there have been significant breakthroughs in terms of developing a culture of safety adhered to by the government and entrepreneurs, the suppliers have encountered difficulties in implementing these initiatives. The limited support from buyers has posed a major challenge for the sustainability of these two multi‐stakeholder agreements.

Leveraging transparency to shift capital‐labour relations in garment sector production: A critical analysis of the design and structure of the Bangladesh Accord

“…For Rahman and Rahman (2020), these issues highlight a disconnect between the terms of the Accord and (at that time) the concurrent Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (the Alliance) and the levels of cooperation required from lead firms and the State in order to actually implement the initiatives. Misunderstandings around the terms of financial compensation for relocating factories, for example, demonstrates the challenge of maintaining cooperation across all aspects of the Accord (Rahman and Rahman 2020). Such findings suggest that legitimacy may be undermined by the actions of lead firms when their commercial practices are at odds with the social and ethical goal of improving labour conditions.…”

“…However, the Accord's legal basis also had unintended consequences in terms of risk, producing a form of "coercive compliance" in which suppliers were reluctant to disclose regulatory breaches for fear of repercussions (Rahman and Rahman 2020). Furthermore, the Accord was confined to larger first-tier suppliers, broadly omitting the vast network of subcontractors concealed within smaller factories (Khan and Wichterich 2015;Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly 2014).…”

Evaluation of Causes and Effects of Fire and Other Safety Incidents in Readymade Garment Industry of Bangladesh

“…The Rana Plaza collapse was the worst industrial accident in the history of the garment industry in Bangladesh. In the wake of the tragedy, two significant transnational governance initiatives emerged "the Accord afire and Building Safety in Bangladesh" (Accord) and "the Alliance for Bangladesh Workers Safety" (Alliance) [2]. After the tragedy occurred, the policy response included a change in Bangladeshi labor law, international buyercoordinated building inspections, tariff penalties, and attempts at improved social dialogue coordinated by international buyers, unions, the Bangladeshi government, and therefore the ILO [3].…”

“…Also, the second-highest number of injured is 528 people and deaths are 90 people. Whether the lowest injured and death number was in Cumilla and these were2 and 1. e) Almost 49.78% were injured by the building collapse, 47.19% were injured by the fire, 2.12% were injured by the boiler bust, 0.90% were injured by other incidents and 70.92% died by the building collapse, 26.11% died in the fire, 2.90% died by the Boiler bust, 0.06% died other incidents (actual rate). f) Almost 37.54% were injured by the building collapse, 35.59% were injured by the fire, 1.60% were injured by the boiler bust, 0.68% were injured by other incidents and 17.43% died in the building collapse, 6.42% died by the fire, 0.71% died by the Boiler bust, 0% died other incidents (total rate).…”

Global value chains and supplier perceptions of corporate social responsibility: a case study of garment manufacturers in Myanmar

“…Accordingly, we need a better sense of supplier perceptions of CSR and the alignment between suppliers' understanding and buyers' understanding, as encapsulated in buyers' codes of conduct. Yet, little extant literature investigates supplier perceptions of CSR in GVCs (Fontana and Egels-Zandén 2018;Rahman and Rahman 2020).…”