Much sweat, much pay - less sweat, less pay? Evidence of "cronyism" in the determination of the remuneration of Brazilian executives

Reflections of Corporate Governance on Pay-Performance Sensitivity: A New Perspective

“…However, PPS had a negative relationship with the proportion of independent board members. Veloso et al (2019) between the CEO/Chairman duality and executive compensation, in opposition to previous authors. In view of this background, there is no consensus on the way the variables of the board influence the sensitivity of compensation to performance.…”

“…While some studies have found a positive association (Brandão et al, 2019;Degenhart et al, 2017), others have not found any significant effect between executive compensation and firm performance (Silva & Chien, 2013;Ermel & Do Monte, 2018;Veloso, Santos, Pimenta, Cunha, & Cruz, 2019). In a study with 66 non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2014, Veloso et al (2019) found no association between executive compensation and economic and financial performance. Degenhart et al (2017) analyzed a sample of 219 firms listed on BM&FBovespa from 2011 to 2015.…”

“…São Paulo, 23(1), eRAMF220088, 2022 doi:10.1590/1678-6971/eRAMF220088 To reinforce the monitoring of managers, the quality and composition of the board may be a key aspect to reduce the bargaining power of managers, seeking a balance between compensation and the increase in firm performance. Therefore, attributes as the duality of the roles of CEO and Chairman and the independence of the board have been used in international (Amzaleg et al, 2014;Chen, Lin, Lu, & Zhang, 2015;Jaiswall & Bhattacharyya, 2016;Sheikh et al, 2017) and national research (Abraham & Singh, 2016;Brandão et al, 2019;Veloso et al, 2019) to verify how executive compensation is sensitive to variations in performance.…”