The Republicans gained a majority in the US House from the 1994 elections, and upon taking office they rewrote the rules that determine legislative power relations. This paper combines a 1996 attitudinal survey of US Representatives with demographic information, status within the House, and party position to examine the impact of the 1995 rule changes on satisfaction, ambition, and retirement. This paper demonstrates that member reactions to reform are explained jointly by their partisanship and their relative position within their party. Senior members of any party dislike rules making power more exclusive, and dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of retirement.
THE REPUBLICAN RULE CHANGESFollowing their 1994 election victory, the new Republican majority in the US House of Representatives adopted a series of institutional reforms that substantially altered the rules of the game under which that chamber operates. Those changes appear to strengthen the power of the leadership and reduce the autonomy of committees and their members. The reforms enhanced the power of leaders and the Speaker, altered the jurisdictions, composition and decision processes of committees, reduced the role for seniority, and changed scheduling procedures and the conduct of floor deliberations. These significant changes in formal chamber rules afford us the chance to explore whether individual members' reactions to the new institutional context is shaped by their position in the House. For instance, do members of the majority party respond to these new organisational incentives in a way that distinguishes them from their minority party counterparts? Or do