Moving toward a “middle ground”?—The governance of platforms in the United States and China

Abstract

How has the governance of platforms evolved between the United States and China in recent years? There is already an abundance of literature written about the governance of platforms pertaining to each country respectively. Despite this, a dual‐track accounting of the governance of platforms in the United States and China in tandem is still lacking. This paper argues that with the historic turbulence of the United States–China relationship and the escalating challenges that governance activities have encountered, the governance of platforms of these two countries are actually more similar than they seem, and have been moving towards a “middle ground,” characterized by multiple governance subjects, more pragmatic and balanced goals, as well as a full range and tit‐for‐tat governance measures. To prove this trend, this paper uses documentary research and a comparative approach to analyze changes in the subjects, objectives and means of governance of platforms for the United States and China. Following that, this paper explains the motivation behind the trend towards the “middle ground” governance of platforms in the context of United States–China relations.

Regulating the platform giants: Building and governing China's online economy

“…Second, the government strengthened its antimonopoly agency and opened antitrust investigations into all the major platform companies for uncompetitive behavior (He, 2022). Third, the government increased its oversight of the platforms' control over data (Cai & Wang, 2022).…”

“…For instance, in 2019, the SAMR began reviewing the exclusionary practices of China's internet platforms, especially Alibaba, following years of complaints from merchants who were forced to “choose one of two” (二选一) (Zhang & Chen, 2020), effectively punishing merchants who sold on rival platforms. By April 2021, bolstered with this high‐level political support, the SAMR warned the 34 largest platform companies to abandon the “choose one of two” practice, with enforcement eventually spreading to provincial antitrust authorities to conduct local investigations (Cai & Wang 2022; Yin et al, 2021). Likewise, in early 2021, the SAMR launched investigations into Alibaba's sales platform as well as into the WeChat Pay platform, including several anti‐competitive practices that had been the cause of complaints from competitors and regulators alike for several years prior (Zhong 2020b).…”

A comparative study on false information governance in Chinese and American social media platforms

“…Although China's internet governance system has often been defined as paternalistic (O'Hara & Hall, 2020), fresh evidence of participatory elements in governance in China has been found (Chin, 2020, 2022; Cai & Wang, 2022; Ma & DeDeo, 2018; Wang et al, 2020). Governance in China is increasingly guided by the state‐led multiactor social participation principle and the slow implementation of legal rationality and rule by law in its regulatory regime (Chin, 2018, 2020, 2022).…”

Platform governance by competing systems of political economy: The United States and China

“…As a result, they pursue various forms of industrial policy, data localization, trade protectionism or exclusion of foreigners. Similarly, Cai and Wang (2022) argue that the platform governance strategies of the two countries are actually more similar than they seem. Unlike Mueller and Farhat (2022), however, they view the departure from liberal globalization more positively, as an evolving “middle groas a more pragmatic and balanced approach to the historic turbulence of the United States–China relationship.…”

“…The papers in this special issue cover platform governance from different angles: international trade and security, social media content, competition policy, privacy litigation, and the digitization of money. Trade and international relations are covered by two papers, one by Mueller and Farhat (2022), the other by Cai and Wang (2022). Mueller and Farhat (2022) conduct a sequential analysis of the rise of barriers to United States–China trade in information‐communication technology and digital platform markets from 2000 to 2021.…”