When deciding while acting, such as sequentially selecting targets during naturalistic foraging, movement trajectories reveal the dynamics of the unfolding decision process. Ongoing and planned actions may impact decisions in these situations in addition to expected reward outcomes. Here, we test how strongly humans weigh and how fast they integrate individual constituents of expected value, namely the prior probability of an action (PROB) and the prior expected reward amount associated with an action (AMNT), when deciding based on the combination of both together during an ongoing movement. Unlike other decision-making studies, we focus on PROB and AMNT priors, and not final evidence, in that correct actions were either instructed or could be chosen freely. This means, there was no decision-making under risk. We show that both priors gradually influence movement trajectories already before mid-movement instructions of the correct target and bias free-choice behavior. These effects were consistently stronger for PROB compared to AMNT priors. Participants biased their movements towards a high-PROB target, committed to it faster when instructed or freely chosen, and chose it more frequently even when it was associated with a lower AMNT prior than the alternative option. Despite these differences in effect magnitude, the time course of both priors’ effect on movement direction was highly similar. We conclude that prior action probability, and hence the associated possibility to plan actions accordingly, has higher behavioral relevance than prior action value for decisions that are expressed by adjusting already ongoing movements.Significance StatementNatural behavior, like foraging or hunting prey, requires animals and humans to select their next action during ongoing movements, thereby updating movements as the decision process unfolds. Here, we study the magnitude and time course with which prior action probability and prior expectancy of reward amount influence the selection between two competing movements in humans. By simultaneously but independently manipulating both priors in individual decisions, and by avoiding confounds of reward probability, we show that both priors affect the decision process with different magnitude yet comparable time courses. Our results emphasize the prioritized relevance of action probabilities over action values on mid-movement decisions.