Motivation, commitment and the use of incentives in partnerships and alliances

Bresnen, Mike; Marshall, Nicholas

doi:10.1080/014461900407392

Cited by 195 publications

(150 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Cost-plus contracts may avoid the problem of overpayment, provided that it is well documented, but the client may expose himself to the problem of cost Facilities -Special Issue on Infrastructure Management (Final Accepted Manuscript), Volume 29, Issue 13/14, October 2011, Pages 542-562 padding (Badenfelt, 2010b). In order to reduce the negative effect of cost-plus contracts, it becomes a common practice to replace a standard cost-plus contract with a target cost contract which is believed to reinforce the deep collaboration between the client and contractor (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000).…”

Section: Rationale Behind Using Tccmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preferred risk allocation in target cost contracts in construction

Chan

Lam

et al. 2011

Facilities

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Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to identify the party most preferred to take the risks associated with the Target Cost Contracts and Guaranteed Maximum Price Contracts (TCC/GMP) in the Hong Kong context. Design/methodology/approach -An empirical questionnaire survey was conducted with the relevant industrial practitioners to solicit their preferences of risk allocation in TCC/GMP construction projects in Hong Kong. Findings -The survey findings indicated that risks on tender documentation and project design are better borne by clients, while construction related risks are perceived to be taken by contractors. The research findings are consistent with other similar studies on risk allocation in construction projects in general. Practical implications -This paper has developed a preferred risk allocation scheme for the delivery of future TCC/GMP projects, taking Hong Kong as an example. It can serve as a useful guide for the decision makers to determine an optimal risk allocation at the planning stage of a TCC/GMP scheme. Originality/value -This study is expected to benefit both academic researchers and industrial practitioners in generating an equitable risk sharing mechanism for TCC/GMP projects. It has provided sufficient empirical evidence, added to the growing body of knowledge and laid a solid foundation for further research such as an international comparison of various risk allocation schemes associated with this kind of contractual arrangement.

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Section: Rationale Behind Using Tccmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preferred risk allocation in target cost contracts in construction

Chan

Lam

et al. 2011

Facilities

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“…However, research also shows that their use can be problematic and sometimes even counterproductive. The discourse on performance incentives usually confounds firms with the managers representing them (see Bresnen and Marshall, 2000a;Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b). Agency theory, which underpins the use of performance incentives, assumes that agents will shirk unless their actions contribute directly to their own economic self-interest.…”

Section: Contractual Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, several issues raise serious difficulties with the uptake of, understanding of, approach to, and implementation of, partnering within and across different national and organizational settings (Loraine, 1994;Green, 1999;Uher, 1999;Bresnen and Marshall, 2000a;Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b;Li et al, 2000;Fisher and Green, 2001;Bresnen and Marshall, 2002;Naoum, 2003). In time, research has shed light on some of the contentious issues surrounding the concept of partnering.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual Model of Partnering and Alliancing

Anvuur

Kumaraswamy

2007

J. Constr. Eng. Manage.

123

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This item was submitted to Loughborough's Institutional Repository (https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence conditions.For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ Conceptual model of partnering and alliancing 1Aaron M. Anvuur and Mohan M. Kumaraswamy, M.ASCE Partnering as a concept has matured in its application and many empirical studies provide evidence of its impact on project performance beyond the rather prescriptive and anecdotal claims of earlier cookbooks on the subject. What has remained elusive, however, is a guiding theory on partnering. Drawing on the literature, partnering is explained within the framework of intergroup contact theory and teamwork in organizations. More specifically, partnering has the potential to create the essential conditions for optimal intergroup contact and hence, to reduce bias and increase cooperation among construction project workgroups and, consequently, IntroductionOver the last decade, partnering has gained considerable popularity. However, several issues raise serious difficulties with the uptake of, understanding of, approach to, and implementation of, partnering within and across different national and organizational settings (Loraine, 1994;Green, 1999;Uher, 1999;Bresnen and Marshall, 2000a;Bresnen and Marshall, 2000b;Li et al., 2000;Fisher and Green, 2001;Bresnen and Marshall, 2002;Naoum, 2003). In time, research has shed light on some of the contentious issues surrounding the concept of partnering. A number of empirical studies (e.g., Weston and Gibson, 1993;Larson, 1995;Gransberg et al., 1999) and a plethora of anecdotal evidence support the espoused benefits of partnering. Research highlights the usefulness and benefits of extending the practice of partnering down the entire supply and value chain to include subcontractors (e.g., Mathews et al., 1996;Love, 1997;Kale and Arditi, 2001;Miller et al., 2002;Sze et al., 2003). Partnering forms of contract (e.g., PPC 2000) attempt to prescribe and govern the behavior and relationships of contracting parties. While the legal status of such express good faith clauses has been questioned and their full practical import is yet unknown (see Cornes, 1996;Cox and Thompson, 1996), these attempts demonstrate a bold commitment to overcome the legal obstacles to the wider adoption of partnering. Some research has considered the potential impact of different cultural and national contexts on partnering performance (e.g., Kwan and Ofori, 2001;Liu and Fellows, 2001;Koraltan and Dikbas, 2002). With 'success stories' of partnering emerging from diverse cultural settings (e.g., Bennett and Baird, 2001;Bayliss et al., 2004;Chan, Chan, Fan et al., 2004), the general view is that partnering is by no means exclusive to any country, continent or culture. 3However, partnering still lacks conceptual-definitional specificity. Partnering is variously defined by its outcomes or the processes involved in its implementation...

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“…On the other hand, target cost contracts have cost incentives/disincentives that allow contractors to share both savings and overspendings with clients according to sharing formulas (Chan et al 2010). This is usually called gain/pain sharing or reward/risk sharing (Bresnen and Marshall 2000). Target cost contracts have attained a growing popularity in the construction industry, which can be seen from a considerable number of publications.…”

Section: Incentivization For Different Project Objectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

Hazır

Haouari

Erel

2014

Handbook on Project Management and Scheduling Vol. 2

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This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) PrefaceThis handbook is devoted to scientific approaches to the management and scheduling of projects. Due to their practical relevance, project management and scheduling have been important subjects of inquiry since the early days of Management Science and Operations Research and remain an active and vibrant field of study. The handbook is meant to provide an overview of some of the most active current areas of research. Each chapter has been written by well-recognized scholars, who have made original contributions to their topic. The handbook covers both theoretical concepts and a wide range of applications. For our general readers, we give a brief introduction to elements of project management and scheduling in the first chapter, where we also survey the contents of this book. We believe that the handbook will be a valuable and comprehensive reference to researchers and practitioners in project management and scheduling and hope that it might stimulate further research in this exciting and practically important field.Short-listing and selecting the contributions to this handbook and working with more than one hundred authors have been a challenging and rewarding experience for us. We are grateful to Günter Sch...

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Motivation, commitment and the use of incentives in partnerships and alliances

Cited by 195 publications

References 15 publications

Preferred risk allocation in target cost contracts in construction

Preferred risk allocation in target cost contracts in construction

Conceptual Model of Partnering and Alliancing

Robust Optimization for the Discrete Time-Cost Tradeoff Problem with Cost Uncertainty

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