Motivated resistance and openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information.

Abstract

Three experiments investigated the relation between need for cognitive closure and persuasion. In the 1st study, Ss high on an individual-differences measure of need for closure were more resistant to persuasion by their low need-for-closure counterparts than vice versa. In the 2nd study, Ss in a noisy environment, assumed to instill a relatively high need for closure, were more resistant to persuasion than Ss in a quiet environment, but only in presence of an initial informational base for an opinion. In its absence, Ss in the noisy (vs. quiet) environment were less resistant to persuasion. The interaction between need for closure and informational base was replicated in the 3rd experiment reverting to the individual-differences measure of need for closure. The discussion considered implications of these findings for further persuasion phenomena. An essential part of the persuasion process is formation of a new judgment by the "persuadee" in response to the persuader's advocacy. If so, the process whereby all judgments are formed or modified may be expected to also underly various persuasion phenomena. This assumption is implicit in major recent models of attitude change (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It suggests that individuals' reactions to persuasion depend both on their cognitive ability to make sense, and critically evaluate the persuasive messages, and their motivation to apply that ability toward the processing of message information. Features of ability and motivation also figure importantly in the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989, 1990b), concerned with processes governing subjective knowledge, that is, with formation and change of people's opinions and judgments. In the lay epistemic framework, an important ability-related element is topic-relevant information available and accessible to the individual (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). Furthermore, an important motivational factor is the individual's need to have cognitive closure on a judgmental topic. How prior knowledge and need for closure combine to affect persuasion is the central issue explored in the present research. Our general assumption is that depending on prior information, need for closure may differently impact individuals' mode of information processing and that this, in turn, may affect their reactions to persuasion. The need for closure has been described as "the desire for a

Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages about Immigrant Groups

“…For example, people who are ambivalent toward a group might generally possess a higher need for cognition, which is an individual difference variable that has been shown to facilitate systematic processing (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986;Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). To test whether this possible relation might explain our findings, we asked our additional sample of 36 participants to complete measures of need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), need for closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and tolerance for ambiguity (McLain, 1993). Results indicated that ambivalence toward Oriental people was not significantly related to need for cognition, r(34) 5 2.27, ns.…”

The calibrated sigma method: An efficient remedy for between-group differences in response category use on Likert scales

“…Need for Predictability was measured by means of eight items, three of which are reverse-scored (see the Appendix of Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem (1993) for the items). To measure and remedy response scale usage differences, the RPS was also included in the questionnaire (Greenleaf, 1992b).…”

Naming is framing: the public understanding of scientific names

“…The results showed, however, that, against expectations, attitudes towards the unfamiliar concepts were nearly identical to the attitudes towards the associated familiar concept uniformly and independent of a personal need for closure. According to the literature, people who would normally avoid closure draw quick conclusions nonetheless when their preference for more information cannot be satisfied due to a (situational) lack of it (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993). With respondents showing different preferences in collecting information before making a decision, the results provide proof that people can turn to category-related attitudes when they are forced to evaluate without information even when they prefer to reach informed evaluations.…”

“…However, a person might experience a difference in need for cognitive closure. In situations where drawing the wrong conclusion can be costly, the need for cognitive closure might be lower (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993). When testing an answer is difficult due to time pressure or lack of resources, people might experience an elevated need for closure.…”

“…Although from a rational perspective it might make sense to hold off making the initial categorization when there is no information or specific knowledge to justify a categorization, there are several indications that people might actually do the opposite. In situations where no information is available, people prefer a quick answer to the question of what a concept entails rather than an accurate answer (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993), especially in noisy daily-life situations where decisions are required (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), such as while shopping for food in a supermarket.…”