Motion and the affection argument

Abstract

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant presents an argument for the centrality of <motion> to our concept <matter>. This argument has long been considered either irredeemably obscure or otherwise defective. In this paper I provide an interpretation which defends the argument's validity and clarifies the sense in which it aims to show that <motion> is fundamental to our conception of matter.Kant's 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) presents a sustained analysis and exposition of the concept <matter> in order to show that matter (the thing) is essentially movable, fills space, possesses motive force, and is a (possible) object of experience.However, as many commentators have noted, Kant's argument for the centrality of <motion> in his exposition of <matter> appears to be at best a highly compressed and potentially dogmatic empirical claim and at worst is wholly specious. The argument attempts to show two claims. First, that the "fundamental determination"[Grundbestimmung] of <matter> is <motion>. 2 Second, that <motion> is a (so to speak)"fecund" predicate, in that all of the other determinations belonging to the nature of matter must be connected to <motion>.Though the argument raises many questions, in this short discussion I focus primarily on the first claim of Kant's argument, concerning the fundamentality of <motion> to our concept <matter>. I construe Kant's argument as enthymematic but plausibly valid, drawing on auxiliary premises that he could have easily assumed as background to the project he outlines in the Preface of the MFNS. In §1 I present some initial interpretive background to the affection argument. §2 constitutes my argument for my preferred interpretation. §3 presents some further considerations concerning the sense in which <motion> is a fundamental determination of <matter>.1 Friedman (2013, 43) calls the argument "especially obscure and cryptic." Watkins considers it "dogmatic," and states that the argument "hardly amounts to a satisfactory justification" of the fundamentality of <motion> (1998, 578).Other commentators (e.g. (Hoppe 1969, 42-43, 63-66); (Walker 1971, 123); (Dahlstrom 1991, 271-90, 285)) have taken the argument to at best show that motion is empirically necessary for human beings to have experience.2 Here and throughout I take a "determination" [Bestimmung] to denote a predicate, which itself is ambiguous between a conceptual item and the worldly feature which the concept picks out. I will use corner brackets to indicate the concept and italics the worldly feature.

Kant on the Fundamental Forces of Matter: Why Attraction and Repulsion?

“…I have been guided by, but have frequently modified, the Cambridge edition of Kant's works for passages translated therein (see note 3 for consistent changes). 2 On this, see Pollok 2001: 149-65;Blomme 2015: 497;McLear 2018. 5 Pollok (2001 remarks that this passage, appearing in an Explication not a Proposition, only provides conceptual preparation for Kant's balancing argument and is not part of it.…”

What Mathematics and Metaphysics of Corporeal Nature Offer to Each Other: Kant on the Foundations of Natural Science

“…22For more on Kant’s argument for the fundamentality of motion to the concept <matter>, see McLear (2018). …”

“…21 That said, in the following, I especially focus on causality as a relation of existence. 22 For more on Kant's argument for the fundamentality of motion to the concept <matter>, see McLear (2018). 23 In a few places, Kant claims that the moving forces are 'essential' to matter or belong to its 'possibility' (see MFNS,4: 511;29: 75).…”

Space, Pure Intuition, and Laws in the Metaphysical Foundations

“…If McLear (2018)'s recent reconstruction of Kant's "affection" argument for the claim that motion is a fundamental determination of matter is correct, then this is yet another place where Kant appeals to a priori properties of space, in particular, its essentially relational character.7 Friedman (2013; 23) also reads the passage as alluding to the Third Law.…”