More Than Pouring Money Into an Ailing Sector? Farm-level Financial Constraints and Kazakhstan’s ‘Agribusiness 2020’ Strategy

Policy Transfer and Diversification in Resource‐Dependent Economies: Lessons for Kazakhstan from Alberta

“…Furthermore, Felipe and Hidalgo () and Khakimzhanov and Seitenova () caution the validity of these “limited successes” as the government of Kazakhstan does not follow systematic monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Five reasons are given for the poor implementation and ineffective outcomes of many of the industrialization initiatives since 2003: (i) unrealistic targets (Khakimzhanov and Seitenova ); (ii) limited capacity of state workers (Khakimzhanov and Seitenova ; Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ); (iii) centralization of the policy process (Ahrens and Stark ); (iv) flawed incentives (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ); and (v) lack of a true multiparty political system (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ).…”

“…The combination of Samruk‐Kazyna and the President's Office being central in Kazakhstan's policy‐making process (Ahrens and Stark ; Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ) has resulted in political favoritism. This has resulted in initiatives which were critical for the country leadership being done very quickly and efficiently, whereas other less politically important policies were often not implemented (Stark, Täube, and Ahrens ).…”

“…This has resulted in initiatives which were critical for the country leadership being done very quickly and efficiently, whereas other less politically important policies were often not implemented (Stark, Täube, and Ahrens ). In addition to political favoritism, flawed incentives have also caused Kazakhstan's industrial initiatives to fail (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ). The authors state that the principal reason for this failure is that “government bodies generally operate without the profit motive and, when they do, they often do not face the same constraints as private firms, such as the menace of bankruptcy in case of long‐term losses” (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel , 105).…”

“…In addition to political favoritism, flawed incentives have also caused Kazakhstan's industrial initiatives to fail (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel ). The authors state that the principal reason for this failure is that “government bodies generally operate without the profit motive and, when they do, they often do not face the same constraints as private firms, such as the menace of bankruptcy in case of long‐term losses” (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel , 105). The authors also suggest that Kazakhstan's regime avoids the critical influence of an electoral cycle.…”

“…The authors also suggest that Kazakhstan's regime avoids the critical influence of an electoral cycle. “Not having to fear the loss of votes from vested interests means that it need not stop a policy approach that has turned out unsuccessful” (Petrick, Oshakbaev, and Wandel , 106).…”