More than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China's Foreign Policy

Abstract

Most analyses of China's foreign and security policies treat China as a unitary actor, assuming a cohesive grand strategy articulated by Beijing. I challenge this conventional wisdom, showing how Chinese provinces can affect the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This contributes to existing research on the role of subnational actors in China, which has focused on how they shape domestic and economic policies. Using Hainan and Yunnan as case studies, I identify three mechanisms of provincial influence – trailblazing, carpetbagging, and resisting – and illustrate them with examples of key provincial policies. This analysis provides a more nuanced argument than is commonly found in international relations for the motivations behind evolving and increasingly activist Chinese foreign policy. It also has important policy implications for understanding and responding to Chinese behaviour, in the South China Sea and beyond.

Beyond the hinterland: exploring the international actorness of China’s Yunnan province

“…Nonetheless, Chinese provinces have keenly pursued their external economic and security interests since the advent of the 'opening up' policy in the late 1970s. The earlier limited number of works on Chinese paradiplomacy tended to be contextualized within a central-provincial relations framework, rather than presenting a full picture of the paradiplomatic activities of Chinese provinces (Chen 2005;Chen, Jian and Chen 2010;Li 2017;Wong 2018). What is more, a geographic bias exists within this body of literature: those interested in Chinese paradiplomacy prefer to investigate the external interactions of better-off coastal provinces rather than border provinces.…”

“…Yunnan continued to conclude a strategic cooperation agreement with the CNPC (Yunnan Daily 2010), which was followed by the setting up of a governor-led steering group to assist the CNPC in the course of land acquisition, village relocation, and infrastructure upgrading (Su 2014). It needs to be added that, for the CNPC, its smooth cooperation with Yunnan provincial authorities throughout the construction of the pipelines can perhaps also be attributed to the close personal relationship between former President Jiang Jiemin and the former Party Secretary of Yunnan Bai Enpei, both of whom worked together in Qinghai province (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001) (Wong 2018).…”

Hainan Province in China’s South China Sea Policy: What Role Does the Local Government Play?

“…Numerous scholars and pundits have analyzed China's policy in the SCS disputes from traditional perspectives of history, security strategy, rivalry with other major powers, Sino-ASEAN relations, domestic nationalism, and material interests such as energy and fishing resources (Ang, 2000;Ba, 2011;Buszynski, 2012;Feng & He, 2018;Fravel, 2011;Goldstein, 2011;Hoo, 2017;Hyer, 1995;Rahman & Tsamenyi, 2010;Weissmann, 2010Weissmann, , 2015aYahuda, 2003;Yoshihara & Holmes, 2011). A few studies have attempted to unpack the role of various sub-state actors in China's SCS policy (Garver, 1992;International Crisis Group, 2012;Jakobson, 2014;Long, 2016;Wong, 2018). Garver (1992), for instance, argues that the Chinese military played the most important role in Beijing's SCS operations in the 1980s and its activism was mainly motivated by a desire for a bigger budget.…”

“…Other studies briefly mention Hainan’s interest in exploring the economic resources in the SCS (International Crisis Group, , ). Wong () uses Hainan’s involvement in the SCS as one of the cases to explore provincial units’ influence on Chinese foreign policy from a micro perspective. She argues that Hainan’s role is manifested in three manners: trailblazing (proposing new policy ideas to the central government), carpetbagging (rhetorically accepting central government’s policy directives but implementing them in ways that are divergent from Beijing’s original plans), and resisting (refusing to implement central government’s policy that is harmful to local interest).…”

“…By 2014, three major oil companies in China had made plans to exploit the energy resources in the SCS: (a) CNPC registered 18 blocks with a total area of 126,848 square kilometers, (b) SINOPEC registered three blocks with a total area of 10,573 square kilometers, and (c) CNOOC registered 82 blocks with a total area of 541,982 square kilometers (W. Li, ). In addition to the energy sector, Hainan’s pursuit of economic interests in the SCS is supported by the Chinese military (Garver, ; Long, ), the tourism sector (Gong, ; Wong, ), law enforcement agencies, and the propaganda machinery (Jakobson, ).…”