Moraliser au nom de la transparence. Genèse et usages de l’encadrement institutionnel du lobbying en France (2004-2017)

Courty, Guillaume; Milet, Marc

doi:10.3917/rfap.165.0017

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…On the other hand, the case study findings seem to cohere with studies showing that politicians tend to symbolically support change when it is not too constraining for them (Courty & Milet, 2018; Crepaz, 2021; Lowery & Gray, 1997; Veksler, 2016). The status quo actors never spoke out openly against greater transparency for lobbying activities targeting mega‐hospitals.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Second, other theories posit that politicians’ attitudes and behaviour towards lobbying regulation result from strategic calculations. Anglo‐Saxon and French studies on the regulation of lobbying suggest that politicians will support a change to the extent that it allows them to make a symbolic gain without harming their interests (Courty & Milet, 2018; Crepaz, 2021; Lowery & Gray, 1997; Veksler, 2016). This theoretical perspective helps us understand why politicians have approved changes that are not constraining for them and for the lobbyists with whom they work.…”

Section: Perspectives From the Literature On The Regulation Of Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How did the disclosure of lobbying targeting Quebec's hospitals become mandatory and with what effect?

Ouimet¹,

Savoie

Montigny³

2023

Can Public Adm

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In 2015 mandatory disclosure activity for lobbying that targeted health and social service centres in Quebec, a sector which consumes a significant share of the annual spending budget, suddenly became a mandatory disclosure activity for lobbyists operating in the province. This research note traces the trajectory of key events that led to this shift towards greater lobbying transparency in the health care sector. The study also analyzes whether this change was followed by increased lobbying registrations for activities targeting health sector institutions. The article's findings suggest that significant change in lobbying regulation may occur accidentally, against the government's will, rather than as a result of an ethical scandal, cross‐jurisdictional learning, or electoral calculations, as the literature suggests. The article's findings also show that the change was followed by an increase of about 969 registered firm lobbyists (p‐value 0.015) and 254 registered lobbyists from covered NGOs (p‐value 0.00).

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