Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics"

Collins, Susan D.

doi:10.2307/1519896

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“…Good conduct preserves, exercises, and strives to improve the existing virtues. Like Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea, many approaches to virtue ethics agree that the moral community in which the actor operates plays a key role in determining what habits and character traits have to be considered virtuous/vicious (Collins 2004;Oakley and Cocking 2008;Hursthouse 1999). In this paper, we will assume that compassion, empathy, and respect are fundamental political and social values in our globalized and cosmopolitan civilization; hence, they are presupposed by every contemporary virtue ethical approach to MCR.…”

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Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition

2019

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This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of humanrobot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of robots and their unsophisticated social capabilities prevent any attribution of rights to robots, which are devoid of intrinsic moral dignity and personal status. On the other hand, we argue that another form of moral consideration-not based on rights attribution-can and must be granted to robots. The reason is that relationships with robots offer to the human agents important opportunities to cultivate both vices and virtues, like social interaction with other human beings. Our argument appeals to social recognition to explain why social robots, unlike other technological artifacts, are capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as pseudo-persons. This recognition dynamic justifies seeing robots as worthy of moral consideration from a virtue ethical standpoint as it predicts the pre-reflective formation of persistent affective dispositions and behavioral habits that are capable of corrupting the human user's character. We conclude by drawing attention to a potential paradox drawn forth by our analysis and by examining the main conceptual conundrums that our approach has to face.

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Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition

2019

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“…Rather, the effort is to examine what toleration looks like according to principles of Aristotelian moral virtue. Turning to Aristotle for liberal, democratic, or conservative purposes is a path well‐trodden, and this article follows these footsteps (Collins ; Dietz ; Frank ; Howland ; Lombardini ; MacIntyre ; Salkever ; Tessitore ; Yack ).…”

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“…Nonetheless, the centrality of the individual in Aristotle's ethics does not preclude concern for one's peers or community. For more on the relationship between the individual, virtue, and the community, see, for example,Collins (2003) andHoipkemier (2018).…”

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When Toleration Becomes a Vice: Naming Aristotle's Third Unnamed Virtue

Avramenko

Promisel

2018

American J Political Sci

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Toleration is lauded as a chief virtue of contemporary liberalism. Without this virtue, it seems, citizens are illequipped to reconcile ethical disagreements appropriately in pluralistic societies. In recent scholarship and practice, however, toleration has undergone significant transformation. The tolerant citizen, we are told, avoids causing the discomfort or pain associated with uncomfortable conversations, criticism, or even difference of opinion. Regrettably, this understanding of toleration hinders rather than facilitates dialogue and conflates pain or discomfort with cruelty. To offer a more viable theoretical grounding for toleration, this article turns to the third unnamed virtue of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. When conceptualized as an Aristotelian moral virtue with vices of both deficiency and excess, it is clear how toleration, taken too far, becomes a vice. Moreover, Aristotle's principles of contextual sensitivity, other-regarding virtue, and non-cruel pain constitute a better foundation for restoring toleration as a healthy virtue for liberal citizens.

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“…Έχει προφανώς δίκιο ότι η υποκριτική δεν είναι η τέχνη της ποίησης".292Ο Δρομάζος (1982: 25) επισημαίνει πως όσα αναφέρονται στο ύφος και στη γραμματική κατά μήκος των κεφ. 19-22 του Περὶ Ποιητικῆς οφείλουν πιθανότατα κάτι στα εγχειρίδια για τη ρητορική και στους γλωσσολογικούς διαλογισμούς των σοφιστών 293. 1.1d.1-2 Erbse: Ἄειδε: ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν.294 Βλ.…”

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Ο Αριστοτέλης Ως Λογοτεχνικός Κριτικός Του Αρχαϊκού Έπους Και Της Λυρικής Ποίησης

Σαραντοπούλου¹

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Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή κινήθηκε γύρω από έναν κεντρικό άξονα: την ιστορία και την κριτική της λογοτεχνίας στα δύο μεγάλα γένη της αρχαίας ελληνικής γραμματείας (επική και λυρική ποίηση). Στόχος της είναι η εξέταση της αρχαίας λογοτεχνικής κριτικής στο αριστοτελικό corpus με βάση το στερεότυπο κείμενο, προκειμένου να μελετηθούν αναλυτικά η λειτουργία, η σπουδαιότητα και τα όριά της. Μπορεί ο Αριστοτέλης να ασκεί αμιγώς λογοτεχνική κριτική στο Περὶ ποιητικῆς, στα κεφ. 1-12 του τρίτου βιβλίου του Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, στα βιβλία Α, α, Λ του Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ και ενίοτε σε κάποια άλλα συγγράμματά του, αλλά η παρούσα εργασία στοχεύει στην περαιτέρω ανάλυση, στο μέτρο του δυνατού, όλων των αναφορών του σε κάποιον επικό ή λυρικό ποιητή και στην εξαγωγή χρήσιμων συμπερασμάτων. Η εργασία διαρθρώνεται σε επτά κεφάλαια, ακολουθούν τα συμπεράσματα (8ο κεφάλαιο), έπεται η βιβλιογραφία (πρωτογενής και δευτερογενής) και δύο ευρετήρια παραθεμάτων (αρχαίων και νεότερων κύριων ονομάτων) που βοηθούν στην ανάγνωσή της.

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Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics"

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition

Sympathy for Dolores: Moral Consideration for Robots Based on Virtue and Recognition

When Toleration Becomes a Vice: Naming Aristotle's Third Unnamed Virtue

Ο Αριστοτέλης Ως Λογοτεχνικός Κριτικός Του Αρχαϊκού Έπους Και Της Λυρικής Ποίησης

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