Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions

Beebe, James R.; Undercoffer, Ryan

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9653-6

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Subsequent experiments, varying the stimuli and the populations, have replicated this pattern (e.g. Machery, et al, 2010;Beebe & Undercoffer, 2015;2016;Sytsma, et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Li¹,

Liu²,

Chalmers³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Past work has shown systematic differences between Easterners' and Westerners' intuitions about the reference of proper names. Understanding when these differences emerge in development will help us understand their origins. In the present study, we investigate the referential intuitions of English-and Chinese-speaking children and adults in the U.S. andChina. Using a truth-value judgement task modelled on Kripke's classic Gödel case, we find that the cross-cultural differences are already in place at age seven. Thus, these differences cannot be attributed to later education or enculturation. Instead, they must stem from differences that are present in early childhood. We consider alternate theories of reference that are com patible with these findings and discuss the possibility that the cross-cultural differences reflect differences in perspective-taking strategies.

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“…Subsequent experiments, varying the stimuli and the populations, have replicated this pattern (e.g. Machery, et al, 2010;Beebe & Undercoffer, 2015;2016;Sytsma, et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Li¹,

Liu²,

Chalmers³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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“…For instance, we know almost nothing about whether the sensitivity of knowledge ascription to stakes varies across cultures. Finally, a robust body of evidence shows that the intuition elicited by the Gödel case varies across cultures (Machery et al., ; Machery et al., ; Machery et al., ; Beebe & Undercoffer, ; Machery, Sytsma, & Deutsch, ; Sytsma, Livengood, Sato, & Oguchi, ).…”

Section: Philosophical Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gettier Across Cultures¹

Machery

Stich

Rosé

et al. 2015

Nous

137

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In this paper, I argue that, as far as Gettier cases are concerned, appearances are deceiving. That is, Gettier cases merely appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but are in fact cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). Gettier cases are cases of reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider Gettier cases. This, in turn, is a good reason not to assign much, if any, evidential weight to Gettier intuitions (i.e., that S doesn't know that p in a Gettier case).

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“…The most important exception is the classic Machery et al (2004) study indicating a difference in intuitions about reference between Western and Asian participants. Subsequent studies confirm that there is indeed a real demographic difference here (e.g, Beebe & Undercoffer, 2015;Machery et al, 2009; but see Cova, et al, 2018). This is a beautiful and deeply important result, which has been justly celebrated.…”

Section: Reevaluating the Implications Of Early Studiesmentioning

confidence: 59%

Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences

Knobe

2019

Epistemology &Amp; Philosophy of Science

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Within the existing metaphilosophical literature on experimental philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the claim that there are large differences in philosophical intuitions between people of different demographic groups. Some philosophers argue that this claim has important metaphilosophical implications; others argue that it does not. However, the actual empirical work within experimental philosophy seems to point to a very different sort of metaphilosophical question. Specifically, what the actual empirical work suggests is that intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. Prior to empirical study, it seemed plausible that unexpected patterns of intuition found in one demographic group would not emerge in other demographic groups. Yet, again and again, empirical work obtains the opposite result: that unexpected patterns found in one demographic group actually emerge also in other demographic groups. I cite 30 studies that find this sort of robustness. I then argue that to the extent that metaphilosophical work is to engage with the actual findings from experimental philosophy, it needs to explore the implications of the surprising robustness of philosophical intuitions across demographic differences.

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Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions

Cited by 11 publications

References 29 publications

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Gettier Across Cultures¹

Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences

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Moral Valence and Semantic Intuitions

Cited by 11 publications

References 29 publications

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

What is in a name? The Development of Cross-Cultural Differences in Referential Intuitions

Gettier Across Cultures1

Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences

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Gettier Across Cultures¹