Moral Uncertainty

Abstract

Very often, we’re uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don’t know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, or how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty? Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. In this book, philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. They argue that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions given moral uncertainty. They then defend an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions according to which the correct way to act in the face of moral uncertainty depends on whether the moral theories in which one has credence are merely ordinal, cardinal, or both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable. They tackle the problem of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, discussing several novel potential solutions. Finally, they discuss implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics, and show how their account can shed light on the value of moral enquiry.

Exploring Risks of Human Challenge Trials For COVID‐19

“…HCTs are not risk‐free, but the balance of risk and benefits seems to clearly favor allowing them, as a large group of experts has argued (Sooner et al., 2020). This conclusion is disputed by some, but all decisions are made despite uncertainties and debate—whether empirical or moral (Lockhart, 2000; MacAskill, Bykvist, & Ord, 2020). The question is whether the both empirical and moral balance of factors lead to the indicated conclusion.…”

Exploring Risks of Human Challenge Trials for COVID-19

“…Human challenge trials are not risk free, but the balance of risk and benefits seems to clearly favor allowing them, as a large group of experts has argued (Sooner et al, 2020). This conclusion is disputed by some, but all decisions are made despite uncertainties and debate – whether empirical or moral (Lockhart, 2000; MacAskill, Bykvist, & Ord, 2020). The question is whether the both empirical and moral balance of factors lead to the indicated conclusion.…”

Taking values seriously

“…To make sense of this claim we need to somehow make comparisons between Singer's own theory and the common-sense theory. Such comparisons are crucial if we want to make decisions under evaluative uncertainty on the basis of value-comparison between theories, for instance, by hedging and avoiding taking great evaluative risks (MacAskill et al 2020;Lockhart 2000). Realism about value magnitudes may help us to make sense of such comparisons.…”